<h5>Dates of concern</h5>
The urgency for wisdom in balancing the rights and protections of all student groups appears to have been mowed down in the removal of Shaima Dallali from her post as president-elect and the de facto renewal of the IHRA definition of antisemitism in the National Union of Students (NUS).
In July 2022, the Institute for Race Relations, the oldest race relations body in Britain put forward a <a href="https://irr.org.uk/article/irr-submission-investigation-antisemitism-nus/">submission to the inquiry</a> on antisemitism in the NUS. The submission, made By Liz Fekete and Frances Webber, adhered to the submission guidelines to note all dates of concern. Interestingly, they highlight 26 April 2017, the date the NUS adopted the <a href="https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definitions-charters/working-definition-antisemitism">IHRA</a> (International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance) definition at the National Conference in their submission. This is because they foresaw, as have many legal and <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13068-Strategy-on-combating-antisemitism-and-fostering-Jewish-life-in-the-EU/F2661357_en">academic specialists</a>, including the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/13/antisemitism-executive-order-trump-chilling-effect">original author</a> of the definition, the far-reaching consequences incurred of “a bifurcated approach to racial justice” ensuing from a highly contested definition that encroaches on the freedom to criticise Israel.
Warning of the inevitable “deterioration of relations” between Black/minority and Jewish student organisations, they conclude by urging the independent lead to consider “the wisdom of the NUS incorporation of the IHRA definition into policy-making and its impact on community cohesion on campus”. These warnings were grounded in a clear recognition of antisemitism and a duty to protect Jewish students but were equally mindful that antisemitism could not readily, presumptively or instrumentally be conflated with principled anti-Zionist critique of Israel. As with countless other objections to the IHRA definition (namely the way it insulates Israel’s <a href="https://www.ejiltalk.org/beyond-discrimination-apartheid-is-a-colonial-project-and-zionism-is-a-form-of-racism/">colonial project</a> from legitimate critique), concerns it would impinge on freedom of expression are being widely realised. While the case of Shaima Dallali intersects with these same contentions, this is not a straightforward case of curtailed freedoms. Rather, as the inquiry process indicates, it is steeped in racialised rationale.
Shaima Dallali is a Black Muslim woman and was voted in as President of the NUS in March 2021. However, by late March, her presidency was being called into question on account of a tweet dating some 10 years prior which referenced a historic battle, ‘Khaybar’, in which Jewish tribes were fought for reneging on an earlier pact with Prophet Mohammed (pbuh). Hash-tagged #Gaza, this was tweeted in reference to the Israeli offensive in Gaza in 2012.

Dallali unreservedly <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2022/apr/20/new-nus-leader-welcomes-antisemitism-inquiry-but-fears-for-her-safety">apologised</a> for the tweet prior to her electoral campaign, acknowledging it as a misconception <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/education/2022/apr/20/new-nus-leader-welcomes-antisemitism-inquiry-but-fears-for-her-safety">‘of the conflict’</a> from her teen years. It has nonetheless been routinely invoked, alongside other published allegations, overshadowing the ‘<a href="https://www.nus.org.uk/independent_investigation_into_antisemitism">independent inquiry’</a> that was to follow and has become the <a href="https://www.carter-ruck.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/DALLALI-Press_Release-17_03_23.pdf">lynchpin allegation</a> in her dismissal.
Instigated by the UJS, the UK’s largest body for Jewish students and self-avowed <a href="https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/ujs/pages/643/attachments/original/1633523849/CONSTITUTION_-_last_edited_Conf_2020.pdf?1633523849">pro-Israel interest group</a>, the inquiry purported to examine allegations of antisemitism both with regard to Dallali and within the NUS at large. Facilitated by governmental and political pressure and with full compliance of the NUS, the inquiry was led by Rebecca Tuck KC. NUS President Dallali welcomed the investigation, but in November, following a confidential disciplinary under the NUS Code of Conduct, it resulted in her dismissal from post.
Dallali responded by initiating a legal case on 2 November 2022 on grounds of <a href="https://www.carter-ruck.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/DALLALI-Press-Release-2.11.2022.pdf">discrimination</a>. Some unions have sought to <a href="https://thetab.com/uk/london/2022/12/06/motion-passed-for-queen-mary-su-to-disaffiliate-from-nus-over-anti-palestinian-racism-48623">disaffiliate</a> from the NUS and many students have been quietly aghast at how a democratic mandate has been overturned without the customary vote of ‘no confidence’. Mired in multiple procedural <a href="https://twitter.com/ShaimaDallali/status/1616480734058774538?cxt=HHwWlICwvbiq8u4sAAAA">irregularities</a> and the exclusion of key constituencies and viewpoints, the dual inquiry has been <a href="https://britpalcommittee.co.uk/press-release-nus">discredited</a> from the outset. Her case has recently resurfaced in view of recent <a href="https://www.carter-ruck.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/DALLALI-Press_Release-17_03_23.pdf">Employment Tribunal proceedings</a> against the NUS on 17 March 2023. Here, I consider the racialised hierarchies and culture of surveillance such processes have relied upon and the deeply invested political context in which they are being institutionalised.

shaima-dallali-megaphone

Shaima Dallali Megaphone

<h5>Genealogies of surveillance </h5>
In seeking to tackle one form of racism, in this case, antisemitism, the inquiry has arguably further entrenched others, namely Islamophobic anti-Black racism. From the outset, it has relied upon a racialised stop-and-search culture of targeting Black activists. The excessive scrutiny to which Dallali is subject (a point conceded in the report p.109) runs through the inquiry’s prejudicial approach to the investigation.
Despite a likely confidential disciplinary, full public disclosure of alleged complaints ahead of the inquiry meant Dallali was subject to a publicised parade of <a href="https://labouragainstas.org.uk/news-and-comment/laas-expose-new-nus-president/">racialised smearing</a>. Why would any inquiry openly list allegations for public scrutiny before investigations were complete? This informed what appeared to be foregone conclusions – which continued after Dallali’s dismissal, generating, after legal scrutiny, some less publicised <a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uk-newspaper-issues-correction-story-over-nus-presidents-sacking">forced retractions</a>. Yet for the most part, the extent of racialised sullying provided misleading but useful subtext in the case against her.
For example, in reference to Dallali’s dated tweet, the uncritical repetition of media references to Khaybar as an isolated “<a href="https://antisemitism.org/shaima-dallali-removed-as-nus-president-following-antisemitism-investigation-prompted-by-outrage-from-caa-and-others/">massacre’/expulsion”</a> of Jews by Muslims – <a href="https://cherwell.org/2022/04/22/leader-su-must-take-a-stand-against-nus-antisemitism/">incessantly</a> cited even <a href="https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-63246005">10 months in</a> – anchored Dallali to a highly erroneous slant on historical events. Khaybar comprised a series of battles precipitated by political treason, not religious animosity, and concluded in a negotiated agreement rather than expulsion. Nonetheless, the focus on antisemitic malice effectively became tethered to Dallali’s current pro-Palestinian outlook. These types of racialised narratives, repeated verbatim, work to freeze viewpoints. In this case, fixing Dallali as predisposed to antisemitism a key feature in the <a href="https://mcb.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/FULL-SPREAD-IslamophobiaReport_020321_compressed.pdf">APPG</a> definition of Islamophobia (p.31).

This raises the question as to why the inquiry and disciplinary have insisted on keeping in focus a notably dated and misguided tweet (for which Dallali unreservedly apologised immediately), that run counter to her present anti-colonial political attitudes?
While the disciplinary process has remained blanketed on grounds of confidentiality, the <a href="https://antisemitism.org/following-input-from-caa-ujs-and-others-independent-report-into-nus-finds-it-created-hostile-environment-for-jewish-students-and-calls-for-major-reforms/">genealogy of the inquiry</a> certainly bears further scrutiny. What is required is not further trawling of Dallali’s digital footprint but of the presuppositions underlining the allegations against her, as well as an examination of the <a href="https://mondoweiss.net/2017/01/palestinian-resignation-investigation/">historical consistency</a> with which NUS executives are investigated. Dallali’s case throws up a familiar pattern of racialised scrutiny directed at vocal Muslim proponents of Palestinian liberation.
Indeed, to what extent perceptions of Muslimness guaranteed these alleged “breaches” – we don’t know what these breaches are exactly – is especially relevant. Why among the allegations listed, does raising funds for a Muslim charity or referencing the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/27/yusuf-al-qaradawi-the-muslim-scholar-who-influenced-millions">global status</a> of a <a href="https://themuslim500.com/profiles/yusuf-al-qaradawi/">Muslim scholar</a>, albeit at times controversial, merit investigation into Dallali? What type of racially associative leaps are being enacted in this process? This is a question that underpins the many allegations levelled in <a href="https://www.carter-ruck.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/DALLALI-Press_Release-17_03_23.pdf">legal proceedings against the NUS</a>.
These considerations remain paramount because, as Dallali’s legal proceedings reveal, a number of allegations of antisemitism were, in fact, concluded to be simply “<a href="https://www.carter-ruck.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/DALLALI-Press_Release-17_03_23.pdf">discourteous</a>”. They were nonetheless projected in the public sphere, planted alongside a broader inquiry into antisemitism and for some time, left entirely intact without any indication of whether they were upheld.
In this context, it is not simply the question of dismissal that is at stake, but a reinforcement of racialised discourses advanced by <a href="https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/HJS-British-Muslim-Anti-Semitism-Report-web-1.pdf">right-wing think tanks</a> (and a <a href="https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/undeniable-overlap-right-wing-zionism-and-islamophobia/">spectrum of Zionist</a> outfits promoting Islamophobia) that equate Muslim political activism (particularly on Palestine) with antisemitism. This is not without precedent in campus politics.

shaima-dallali-group-city-rectors-dinner-262-1

Shaima Dallali-Group-CITY-RECTOR'S DINNER-262-1

<h5>Instituting racialised hierarchies</h5>
Muslim student experiences relating to NUS/student politics over <a href="https://platformonline.uk/posts/students-breaking-the-siege">the last three decades</a> remain sparsely documented. To date, there has been no independent inquiry into Islamophobia within the NUS, although patterns of disenfranchisement, racialised smearing and over-scrutiny abound. Recent calls for NUS to conduct an <a href="https://www.fosis.org.uk/news/nus-failure-towards-addressing-institutional-islamophobia/">equally vigorous inquiry</a> into Islamophobia in the NUS have been met with silence, as have concerns that no institutional support was forthcoming when upon election, Dallali suffered a barrage of abuse.
These concerns reveal a racialised discrepancy in the way students are accorded status as victims or perpetrators of racism. While this discrepancy is not unique to this inquiry, as my own <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365936475_Institutionalised_Islamophobia_Before_Prevent_Muslim_Students_Campus_Watch_and_the_%27Fundamentalist%27_Formation_in_British_Universities">research documents,</a> it can be discerned at many levels in this inquiry which intrinsically reproduces a hierarchy in the way antisemitism and Islamophobia are addressed.
As national umbrella societies for their respective faith communities, the status of both the UJS and FOSIS should be equally respected. Of course, for an inquiry on antisemitism, Jewish students (aligned and non-aligned to the UJS) would be expected to have greater input. Yet, this input is entirely disproportionate for an ‘independent’ inquiry’; UJS members comprise key complainants, instigating an inquiry and determining its lead and Terms of Reference (ToR), while FOSIS and the views of the British Palestinian Committee – the latter relevant due to the targeting of Palestinian advocacy throughout the process – among others, have either been <a href="https://www.fosis.org.uk/news/nus-failure-towards-addressing-institutional-islamophobia/">ignored</a> or <a href="https://britpalcommittee.co.uk/press-release-nus">dismissed</a>, <a href="https://britpalcommittee.co.uk/press-release-nus-report">sparking</a> complaints of negligence and due process.
Representation of ‘adversely impacted groups’ and their concerns, by <a href="https://britpalcommittee.co.uk/press-release-nus-report">all accounts</a>, appears <a href="https://britpalcommittee.co.uk/press-release-nus-report">woefully unfulfilled.</a> Concerns about Islamophobia <a href="https://twitter.com/shaimadallali/status/1567577535839436804?lang=en">raised by Dallali</a>, have not been pursued, although the ToR (4.2), acknowledged that as a “Muslim woman of color” Dallali may be “unfairly targeted”.
In this regard, the inquiry is reminiscent of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/365936475_Institutionalised_Islamophobia_Before_Prevent_Muslim_Students_Campus_Watch_and_the_%27Fundamentalist%27_Formation_in_British_Universities">earlier campaigns in the NUS</a> which were far-reaching in enabling the racialised hypervisibility of Muslim students, while excluding them from consultative investigations. Except at that point, there was relative subtlety in efforts to institutionalise the conflation between antisemitism and anti-Zionism.

Similarly, the inquiry report does not list or cite a single Muslim organisation. This is unsurprising given, in the early stages of the Dallali investigation, Muslim organisations such as <a href="https://www.fosis.org.uk/news/nus-failure-towards-addressing-institutional-islamophobia/">FOSIS</a> and <a href="https://twitter.com/muslimcouncil/status/1587570173699039233?lang=en-GB">MCB</a> were blocked from consultation. Following her dismissal, this <a href="https://manchesterstudentsunion.com/news/article/nus-referendum-vote-no-manifesto">refusal to sufficiently engage</a> with Muslim students has not changed.
Why this may be the case can perhaps be gleaned from the FAQs which insist that the investigator “was able to take specialist advice from organisations and individuals who are trusted within those marginalised communities”. Such inferences would be deemed out of place in any inquiry, let alone one tackling racism. Filtering through the ‘marginalised’, it is highly reminiscent of a post 9/11 approach to managing ‘good’ and ’bad’ Muslims. Indeed, on what basis are Muslim organisations or individuals determined as “trusted” in this inquiry? In view of the lack of transparency in the report, we have no idea who the “specialist” “trusted” ones are.
Like earlier campaigns, this grossly skewed process affirms a view that the absence of meaningful consultation with Muslim and Palestinian constituencies relates to their culpability in alleged antisemitism. This certainly bears out in the final report where, although cognisant of Islamophobia (referenced on 20 separate occasions), there is a peculiar absence of Muslim/Palestinian voices. For Palestinians in particular, one might think their views would be integral to an inquiry that implicates their right to self-determination with antisemitism. It is telling that the only occasions in which Muslims and Palestinians are given voice are through secondary sources that affirm antisemitism within those communities (p.66/67 of the inquiry report).

city-uni-ucu-large-group

City Uni UCU - Large Group

<h5>Operationalising IHRA: No-platforming Palestinian advocacy</h5>
The furore surrounding Dallali’s tweets have taken centre-stage and proved a useful distraction from the political context in which her dismissal has been legitimised.
Allegations against Dallali have pivoted on her refusal to abide by a widely <a href="https://media.euobserver.com/9e86df02ddf67c6046d190b65e4380df.pdf">contested</a> IHRA example-centred definition of antisemitism in which criticism of Israel predominates. Of the <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/611a64c35baa3f33556d5454/t/6295d0a633a872233ad523a4/1653985447843/Formal+Complaint_NUS+Board_31.05.22.pdf">contested compilation of allegations</a>, a number relate to pro-Palestinian activism, including criticism of Zionism as a political ideology. While such resistance is often conflated with antisemitism, it is in fact directed towards Israel’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rset20/2/1">apartheid and settler-colonial regime</a>. Such legitimate non-violent forms of resistance to Israel have <a href="https://bod.org.uk/bod-news/board-of-deputies-and-ujs-launch-first-ever-anti-bds-resource-for-students/">long been opposed</a> by Dallali’s critics.
As many other <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3178109">lesser-known examples</a> in British universities attest, the application of the IHRA has become a key means to regulate critique of Israel, a point dismissed in the inquiry report. In spite of objections to the definition among submissions to the inquiry, and its expiration as democratically mandated policy, it was nonetheless established as a guiding reference in Dallali’s case. Contrary to the NUS’s own <a href="https://assets.nationbuilder.com/nus/pages/222/attachments/original/1670410719/NUS_UK_Rules_May_2019.pdf?1670410719">guidelines</a> stipulating a simple majority vote, it was renewed internally through the NUS administration on seemingly arbitrary grounds. The inquiry has provided a useful springboard for its institutionalisation.

It is not incidental that Dallali’s dismissal has enabled her key critics to formally cast antisemitism slurs on the <a href="https://www.ujs.org.uk/ujs_response_to_nus_president_dismissal">entire electorate</a> that voted her in. This is indicative of a broader ongoing campaign that, rather than seeking to merely oust a single critic, attempts to delegitimise advocacy for Palestinian rights as a whole. This follows a <a href="https://www.newarab.com/opinion/lara-sheehi-stop-silencing-palestine-solidarity-academia?s=09">global pattern</a> which has seen activists and academics who support the <a href="https://platformonline.uk/posts/from-inside-israel-the-dangers-of-repressing-the-bds-movement">Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)</a> movement to <a href="https://bdsmovement.net/what-is-bds">pressure Israel</a> to comply with International law <a href="https://www.plutobooks.com/9780745399461/we-will-not-be-silenced/">subject to prolonged harassment</a>. Indeed, for an inquiry that has claimed a “hostile environment” for Zionist Jewish students, it has done well in nurturing a culture of hostility for anti-Zionist critics, particularly those already subject to racialised targeting. This is entirely in keeping with <a href="https://al-shabaka.org/summaries/criminalizing-palestine-solidarity-activism-in-the-uk/">state-led interventions</a> that seek to <a href="https://al-shabaka.org/briefs/criminalizing-palestine-solidarity-activism-in-the-uk/">crack down on pro-Palestinian activism</a>.
Dallali’s executive dismissal is tantamount to no-platforming Palestinian advocacy, except through pseudo-legal means. The IHRA is <a href="https://research.birmingham.ac.uk/en/publications/the-ihra-definition-of-antisemitism-defining-antisemitism-by-eras/fingerprints/">non-legally binding</a>, but as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1743872118780660">increasingly documented</a>, is being wielded punitively as if it has legal powers. In this inquiry, the use of the IHRA can be seen to institutionalise <a href="https://www.routledge.com/Freedom-of-Speech-in-Universities-Islam-Charities-and-Counter-terrorism/Scott-Baumann-Perfect/p/book/9780367724566">patterns of racialised regulation</a> that precede and function alongside, its adoption. As such, it assumes a disciplinary function to regulate the parameters of anti-colonial, anti-Zionist politics, as evidenced in the inquiry recommendations.

<h5>Reconciling anti-racist practice</h5>
For a war-on-terror-burdened generation, already subject to the ‘counter-terror’ machinations of the state, the excessive scrutiny of Dallali is entirely in keeping with the racialised surveillance of <a href="https://peoplesreviewofprevent.org/prop-report/">Muslims under Prevent</a>. It is, however, entirely at odds with NUS’s own policy focus, <a href="https://www.nus.org.uk/surveillance_on_our_campuses">critical of Prevent</a> and its securitisation of Black and Muslim students.
In this context, the IHRA becomes an addition to the surveillance regime regulating Muslim political expression. This is especially egregious when the NUS has previously committed to an equally non-binding definition of Islamophobia. In the absence of greater transparency, in what shape this commitment to the APPG Islamophobia definition was maintained, remains unknown.

This hodgepodge of policy and practice reflects not just a conflicting approach to racial justice, but enables the racialised governance of Muslim, Palestinian and Jewish activists speaking against Israeli violence. It further entrenches anti-Palestinian/Islamophobic practices but does little to <a href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1-NT3uxzplSwl5O8WLikM77L5RhrlS2df4ZJmUnZK9G0/edit">dislodge </a>antisemitism itself. In short, Dallali’s public ‘lynching’ does not read as a step to overcome antisemitism but a regulatory intervention that works to inhibit particular criticisms of Israel&#8217;s settler-colonialism and to ease Zionist-settler discomfort.
While Dallali’s removal has been applauded by some, this does not equate with a successful inquiry, not least because it is counter-productive to champion the struggle against antisemitism through an inquiry that hinges on racialised presuppositions throughout.
In its less than conciliatory approach and contrary to its stated aims of ‘restorative action,’ the inquiry spotlights the precarity of trumping one ‘side’ over the other, ensuring vulnerability for all. Privileging the political commitments of one group over another is rarely a path to racial justice, in this case, only serving those that resolutely advocate for Israel. Perhaps Dallali’s case will challenge this.
Special thanks to Dr Khadijah Elshayyal, Professor Rebecca Gould, Dr Sara Husseini and Dr Shehla Khan for reviewing earlier versions of this article. Any discrepancies or errors are mine.

<pre>Featured photo: Shaima Dallali</pre>

Shaima Dallali Featured

Why the executive no-platforming of NUS President Shaima Dallali is underlined by Islamophobia, particularly when Palestine is in the frame.

When an elected student leader is no-platformed: Patterns of racialised surveillance

You wish you could waddle 
up the Monivea Road like Lord Haw Haw 
wearing a scar the length of your jaw 
you got fighting communists 
but cut yourself shaving once 
and didn’t like it.
In the absence of a girl who’ll let 
you between her legs 
you’d love to invade Russia or Iran 
but can’t afford the air fare 
so instead smashed some glass.
All you want is a part-time job 
in the local concentration camp 
but there isn’t one around here 
yet, so instead you broke a window 
and heroically chucked some books out it.
You once thought of reading a book 
to find out why you’re where you are 
instead spend the hiatus between 
wanks listening to the voices 
in the videos on your phone tell you 
whose fault your life is.
You needed to be someone 
so wrecked a guy’s framed family photographs, 
fled sniggering up the hill, 
still no one.
This poem follows a gathering of solidarity in <a href="https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/galway-locals-show-solidarity-with-muslim-community-after-mosque-attack-1.3971688">Galway on Monday night</a>, after a mosque was attacked and vandalised.

Kevin Higgins &#8211; Galway &#8211; Photo Alvaro Araoz

Poem: To the Boys Who Carried Out the Ballybrit Mosque Attack

The emptiness of Trump&#8217;s political performance is matched only by the unleashed violence of the ideologies he invokes 
&nbsp; 
At the beginning of the summer, when I designed a course around some of the most popular works of science fiction and fantasy in American pop culture, my plan was to introduce college freshmen to the ways in which non-realistic art has tackled moments of great significance in the history of the US. Given the timing of my course, I had expected, of course, to forge some connections between the works on my syllabus and the events that were taking place outside of the classroom. 
At some point between watching the media circus that has surrounded the elections and reading a news report that declared <a href="http://money.cnn.com/2016/10/20/media/alec-baldwin-donald-trump-debate-saturday-night-live/">Alec Baldwin mimicked Donald Trump</a> so effortlessly on SNL “people felt that it seemed Trump was impersonating Baldwin rather than the other way around,” I came to the conclusion that things were not quite as clear cut as my syllabus would have them seem. At least as far as this election cycle has been concerned, the state of American society is not, as I was trying to teach my students, one in which art imitates politics. Instead, and to the utmost disbelief of this Muslim and immigrant, it is one in which politics has become a dangerously bizarre form of entertainment. 
In a presidential race that has produced more than its fair share of both memes and merchandise (the ubiquitous, red, Make America Great Again baseball caps; Nasty Woman t-shirts and mugs), it is difficult to choose just one example of this absurdist entertainment-politics at work. But it should come as little surprise that the strongest contenders have emerged out of a campaign led by a man most recognisable for his stint on a reality TV show and whose very promise to “make [the country] great again” reads more like advertising copy than a coherent political vision. There were Donald Trump’s digs at Ted Cruz’s wife. The press conference with Bill Clinton’s accusers. The moment in the second debate where Trump vowed – in the same ominous timber he used to declare virtually all facts “wrong” – to <a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/2016/09/29/trumped-up-trickle-down-sexism-donald-trump-and-the-woman-question/">imprison Hillary Clinton</a>. And there were, of course, the rallies.   
Like everything else that the Republican nominee has done on the campaign trail, these moments of showmanship on Trump’s end have been equal parts impulsive egomania and calculated appeal. In the world-other-than-our-own that Trump has created, it doesn’t matter that Enrique Peña Nieto declared Mexico will “never pay for the wall,” or that the candidate’s brags about endorsements have been refuted by everyone from the ICE to the United States military. What matters in the world-of-making-America-great-again is the belief in a collective fiction fostered by Trump, upheld by his supporters, and that invests both with a power they unquestioningly believe they deserve. 
One especially perplexing factor related to Trump’s alternative world is that, for some of the candidate’s supporters, it has value first and foremost as an idea. As a Muslim who has been following along in silent terror as the events of the elections unfolded, I was most struck by this while watching <a href="http://www.cc.com/video-clips/ukn1y5/the-daily-show-with-trevor-noah-muslims-prepare-for-a-donald-trump-presidency">Hasan Minhaj’s special report</a> for The Daily Show from within the Republican National Convention. Minhaj, a Muslim himself, designed his report as a tongue-in-cheek response to one of Trump’s most controversial proposals. Declaring that it was time to say goodbye to America, the comedian prepared for the proposed expulsion of Muslims from the US by interviewing attendees about their favorite things to do in their respective states. In almost every single case, the Trump supporters Minhaj interviewed vehemently reassured him that their candidate of choice would never implement the proposed ban. “Donald Trump isn’t going to kick Muslims out,” said one such supporter. “He’s a guy who shoots off the hip,” said another. Like Minhaj, who ends the segment trying to understand why the people interviewed would vote for Trump in the first place, viewers are left with a confusion that gets at the very heart of the performance/politics divide; for these attendees, Trump’s ability and willingness to carry out his threats are not nearly as important as the bravado of his suggesting them in the first place. 
Most worrying about the reactions of the RNC attendees is not their disregard for what Trump might do if elected, but rather their obliviousness to what was already happening at the time of the convention and what has only gotten worse since. While Trump himself has contorted the working definition of his Muslim ban so many times it is now barely recognisable, the candidate’s rhetoric – the source of the very same words the attendees glibly describe as “shooting off the hip” – reflected itself in the most violently Islamophobic year American Muslims have experienced to date. In the days following Trump’s call for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” hate crimes against Muslims <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hate-crimes-muslims-since-911_us_57e00644e4b04a1497b59970">spiked by 87.5 per cent</a>. Today, 11 months after the proposed ban, the list of crimes has grown to include the murder of two imams, a failed plot to bomb an apartment complex inhabited by Somali refugees, and the brutal beating to death of a Saudi college student outside of a pizzeria in Wisconsin.   
It is in this space, trapped between the rock of empty political performance and the hard place of all too real daily violence, that Muslims in America find themselves a day away from the election. The negative impact of election season on American Muslims is neither new nor confined to Trump. Yet it is Trump, and the alternate reality that he has created, that have confronted American Muslims with a uniquely difficult challenge over the past year. In this world where facts routinely take a backseat to bombastic performance, the presidential candidate has attracted a following that is split between two camps with equally serious consequences to the community: one is so enraged with the false facts they have taken matters into their own hands, and the second is so entertained by the bombastic performance they (ostensibly) have not noticed the violence that ensued in the process. 
As the country reaches the end of what still seems like an interminable process, it is difficult not to consider the lasting ramifications of this election season’s fictions on Muslims and on the nation as a whole. Already, talk of the business mogul launching a television network in the event of his defeat leaves little room for optimism. Indeed, for those of us who have watched in horror as Trump transformed his bid for the presidency into sheer spectacle, the announcement serves a reminder of a decidedly grim scenario the United States now faces: whether in the White House or on Trump TV, the Donald appears intent on a repeat performance.
<pre>Image from: http://on.cc.com/2eOp6OL</pre>

Donald Trump on Repeat: Election Season for American Muslims

The #IllRideWithYou campaign has caused a social media storm reminding the world that Islamophobia is not a thing to be tolerated 
&nbsp; 
The ‪#‎IllRideWithYou‬ campaign is a remarkable phenomenon that marks a new stage in our responses to violence and terror. Like the #crimingwhilewhite campaign, it acknowledges and exposes the vulnerability of others, by those who could have just enjoyed their privilege instead of extending their support. The campaign illustrates a moment where the ordinary heroes around us stand up without waiting to be called. 
The fact that this gesture has been received by many Muslims with <a href="https://soundcloud.com/702abcsydney/adila-from-baulkham-hills-has">such overwhelming emotion</a> and gratitude tells us a lot about attitudes in our societies; being permitted to share in the pain of a tragedy like the Sydney siege, without being accused of being somehow complicit, feels like a gift. 
However frustrating it is for this kind of patronage to even be considered necessary, these are sadly the lows we have reached. When <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vln9D81eO60">Ben Affleck clumsily argued</a> with Bill Maher that the vast majority of Muslims were peace-loving people, the same as the rest of humanity, it felt like a double, triple blow. It was unthinkable that it needed to be said, and ridiculous that it apparently required an impeccably liberal, all-American, non-Muslim Hollywood celebrity to have any hope of the message being listened to. Worst of all was that the sentiments were completely rejected by the rest of the all-white male panel. It was quite a horrific moment. It seemed like this panel had passed a judgement in mainstream US media: Muslims are inherently extremist (unless they explicitly reject Islam). Don’t trust them. 
The word Islamophobia is awkward, but the vulnerability of Muslims to attack and scapegoating is very real – and the visibility of covered Muslim women makes them even more so. 
Reading about the incident that sparked the original #IllRideWithYou tweet, I was reminded of a bus ride in Stockport back in 2006 where a young man tried to pull off my headscarf. I wondered about the other passengers and how they would have reacted if it had been something more serious. 
Despite living in a multicultural environment where Muslims rightly feel part of the community, almost every person can recall stories of being spat on, called a terrorist or having their scarf pulled off – and that&#8217;s just the stories of overt aggression. Nonetheless, the experiences of love, friendship and normality that have always outweighed any abuse. 
I recently watched the pacifist documentary <a href="http://wearemanymovie.com/">We Are Many</a> which examined the anti-war movement that emerged in the wake of 9/11, and the discourse which played out in the western world to figure out how to respond to these terrible attacks. It was emotional recalling how many people across the world united in that call for peace, how hopeful it was, and what price we paid when our governments decided to approach ideologies of violence with violence. 
The world now feels more unstable than ever, wherein the jihadists are promoting an uglier, more brutal and nihilistic vision than ever before. The recent <a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/2014/12/12/where-is-the-end-to-this-cycle-of-tyranny-terrorism-and-war/">CIA torture report</a> gives us a glimpse into how much the guardians of our society were willing to sacrifice our collective humanity. 
In 2002 the Not In Our Name organisation stated a pledge against US military action declaring: Not in our name/ will you wage endless war; Another world is possible/ and we pledge to make it real. By 2014, this message had evolved into the <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/notinmyname">#notinmyname</a> campaign, a defensive declaration for Muslims to assert their rejection of ISIS. From feeling a need to apologise and distance themselves from the actions of our governments, western Muslims were now being expected to vocally distance themselves from a psychotic movement that had never represented them in any way. ISIS, unfortunately, does not make subtle distinctions – either you sign up to their terrifying worldview (by force if necessary) or you are the enemy and a legitimate target. On the other hand, the right-wing western media, among others, are all too ready to lump all Muslims with acts of violence and terrorism. The UK press has repeatedly called for poppy headscarves, the union jack and the likes to be draped around the heads of hijab-clad women so that the ignorant can easily distinguish between the goodies and the baddies. 
Interestingly, the past week has seen the <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/notinmyname">#notinmyname</a> hashtag being used both by Muslims denouncing the Sydney siege, and by Americans expressing renewed outrage at the horrifying torture perpetrated in the name of national security. 
The #IllRideWithYou campaign manages to discard ugly and false stereotypes and attempts to relieve the pressure on Muslims. No apologies or proofs needed, we know you, you are part of us. #IllRideWithYou isn’t about protection. In the end, it is about solidarity. 
One last cheer for the Aussies who inspired us &#8211; and if there’s anyone out there who’s afraid Muslims are strange, alien and possibly violent creatures, come along, #IllRideWithYou and we can talk.
<pre>Image from: Twitter </pre>

#IllRideWithYou: Embracing Sydney’s Solidarity

Hysteria over this Trojan Horse threatens British Muslim children&#8217;s educational achievements 
&nbsp; 
In recent weeks and months the breathtaking <a href="http://www.opendemocracy.net/ourkingdom/mg-khan/trojan-horse-%E2%80%93-conjuring-slave-witch-and-grand-inquisitor" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">&#8216;Trojan Horse&#8217;</a> news that &#8216;Islamic extremists&#8217; in Birmingham and a few other cities are &#8216;taking over&#8217; British schools is all over the place. Many call this a <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/13/alleged-islamic-plot-birmingham-schools-possible-hoax" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">hoax</a>. Being a well-informed member of the British Muslim community (in fact, community of communities) and quite aware of its dynamics and weaknesses, I find this mind-boggling. 
Fertile ideas and accusations are now flying around as Muslim-bashing has become a popular trend in sections of our post-7/7 and post-Woolwich media. Muslims are being seen as a <a href="http://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/96287/suspect-communities-report-july2011.pdf" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">suspect community</a> and subjected to unabashed McCarthysm by some media inquisitors at every opportunity. No community should be above criticism, but continuation of this relentless witch hunt that has increased significantly after the Lee Rigby murder last year, has the potential of reversing the good progress made by Muslims in the public sphere. The fallout from this Trojan Horse saga could damage our education, particularly the attainment of Muslim children achieved over the last two decades. 
We all want decent education for our children and the last thing we need is educational standards failing and our children suffering. A speedy outcome of the investigations that are being carried out by the Birmingham City Council, the Department for Education (DfE) and the Ofsted is thus crucial. A <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/muhammad-abdul-bari/trojan-horse-plot_b_5165619.html" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">Public Inquiry</a> on this should not be ruled out. 
A wild idea has now been thrown out by right wing broadsheets, such as <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/10804289/Head-teachers-raise-serious-concerns-over-Islamic-school-take-over.html" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">The Telegraph</a> and <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationnews/10790441/Guide-to-school-Islamisation-by-ringleader-of-Trojan-Horse-plot.html" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">The Sunday Telegraph</a>, that a handbook (Towards Greater Understanding: Meeting the needs of Muslim pupils in state schools) published by the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 2007 could be behind this alleged Trojan Horse plot. This is extremely inaccurate and misleading. I was at the helm of the MCB in 2007 and I do not recognise this. I cannot recall anyone from the MCB that would prepare a &#8216;Communist Manifesto&#8217; type agenda for some future &#8216;Islamists&#8217; to take over British schools after seven years! The idea that that MCB document was a Communist or Trostkyite-type plot to takeover all Birmingham or UK schools is laughable. This feeds into a wider &#8216;counter-jihadist&#8217; narrative, witnessed in particularly alarming ways from Breivik, the EDL, and others, that Muslims want to &#8220;takeover&#8221;. 
To describe the handbook as &#8216;a document on manipulating teachers and curriculum&#8217; or &#8216;a detailed blueprint for the radical &#8220;Islamisation&#8221; of secular state schools&#8217;, as The Sunday Telegraph puts it, is an insult to the many thousands of professionals and lay people who have been involved over the last ten years in the massive improvements in the educational achievement of young Muslim people. 
There is a level of hysteria building which is not justified, we need to take the temperature down and politicians must not play with these issues or else face a potential backlash, possibly in community cohesion. 
The handbook was a very public document and summation of practices which had already been developed in schools and local authorities throughout Britain in the preceding two decades. It was compiled in close consultation with headteachers and other educationists (Muslims and others) from the mainstream education sector. It was launched by Professor Tim Brighouse, the then Schools Commissioner for London, and, although there was usual disparagement from right wing tabloids such as the Daily Express, it was welcomed as useful and helpful by many teachers and some LEAs. BBC&#8217;s Education Correspondent, Mike Baker, gave a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/education/6391271.stm" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">balanced critique</a> of the handbook and the National Association of Head Teachers posted a statement after its publication welcoming the document as &#8220;helpful and useful&#8221;, although its leader expressed some concerns. 
Based on parental rights given by preceding Education Acts, and by no means prescriptive, the handbook highlighted the needs of many Muslim children in the state sector so that teachers are aware of conservative Muslim traditions and can adopt them, if they so wish, in accordance with the school&#8217;s governance protocol. 
As many Muslim parents were new to the British education system and there were prevailing gaps in understanding between parents and teaching establishments, it was meant to help all to understand the needs of Muslim children from traditional Islamic perspectives. Disagreement on some of the elements or the tone of the Guide was natural. 
Having been encouraged by successive governments, the Muslim community has come a long way in making significant progress in children&#8217;s statutory education. A significant part was also played by various government funded programmes on the achievement of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Somali and Turkish pupils &#8211; mostly Muslims. The bulk of the community started their journey in Britain at a relatively lower level-playing-field, but many talented Muslim professionals have now adopted teaching as their career and are becoming better involved with the education system. 
Government statistics show that nationally pupils of Muslim heritage are achieving results which are the same as, or higher than, the average for all pupils. This remarkable progress is due in large part to the expertise and leadership of the nation&#8217;s headteachers and their staffs, working in partnership and consultation with parents, governors, local authorities and communities. 
There are of course challenges that need to be addressed, but political point scoring or sensational media descriptions should be kept out of our children&#8217;s education.
<pre>Image from: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/apr/15/police-chief-counter-terror-officer-islamic-schools-plot-birmingham</pre>

Politicisation of Alleged &#039;Islamist Plot&#039; to Take Over British Schools Is Dangerous

Britain&#8217;s soaring Muslim prison population is a blight on the community 
&nbsp; 
The shadow Justice Secretary Sadiq Khan has rightly <a href="http://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/calls-for-inquiry-as-figures-show-27-of-londons-prisoners-are-muslim-9221167.html" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">called for an inquiry</a> on rising prison populations from the Muslim community in London prisons. Figures show that 27% of London prisoners are Muslims; double the rate of the overall Muslim population in the city. 
Ministry of Justice figures show that the number of Muslims in the prisons of England and Wales has <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/number-of-muslims-in-prison-doubles-in-decade-to-12000-9222237.html" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">more than doubled to nearly 12,000 in a decade</a>. &#8220;This dramatic rise prompted calls for ministers to investigate whether police and the courts are treating Muslims more harshly, with some suggesting the rise is due to Islamophobia.&#8221; 
In some jails the proportion of inmates of Islamic faith is more than one-third. In Whitemoor, a Category A men&#8217;s prison in Cambridgeshire, it is as high as 43 per cent. A prison inspection report expressed a <a href="http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7662525.stm" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">&#8216;fear that increasing numbers of prisoners were converting to Islam and being radicalised&#8217;</a>. The report also mentioned that &#8220;officers tended to treat Muslim prisoners as extremists and potential security risks, even though only eight of them had been convicted of terrorist offences.&#8221; 
It is feared that the number will rise because of the increasing numbers of Muslim teenagers in youth jails; a large number of teenagers and young men of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin are known to end up in prison from the age of 15 to 25 in recent times. 
It is also an unpalatable reality that young British Muslim prison leavers are more likely to reoffend. They find themselves <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/nabila-pathan/is-a-rethink-required-to-_b_2287153.html" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">ostracised and shunned by the community </a>and therefore &#8220;more likely to turn to their old friends and networks that led to the cycle of crime in the first place.&#8221; <a href="http://www.mosaicnetwork.co.uk/en_gb/portal" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">MOSAIC</a> and <a href="http://www.myh.org.uk/" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">Muslim Youth Helpline</a> have been working to raise awareness of the challenges faced by young Muslims ex-offenders who need additional support from their probation officer, prison staff member or someone from their own community so that they can stay away from reoffending. 
Due to Islam&#8217;s aversion to criminality the Muslim community is generally known to be law abiding. Why then is its prison population consistently and disproportionately increasing year on year, bringing embarrassment and shame to their families and community? 
Analysts point fingers to many reasons &#8211; some internal to the community itself and others external. 
There are some inevitable social factors that one needs to keep in mind &#8211; such as lower educational performance, higher unemployment, poor housing conditions for decades that have given rise to social exclusion of many Muslims. As Muslims mostly live in inner city areas affected by multiple social problems such as drugs and gang issues, they appear to exacerbate the problem. Poor parenting in sections of the community and less-than-satisfactory involvement of young people in mosques and community organisations are some factors that create a disconnection between generations. For impressionable youth this creates a vacuum in their aspiration and hole in their motivation to sail through today&#8217;s complex post-modern and highly secular life. 
On the other hand, it is a stark reality that Black and Asian people remain far more likely than white people to be stopped and searched by the police on the street, arrested and sent to prison. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/nov/14/muslim-prisoners-double-england-wales-ministry-justice" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">In spite of a reduced use of stop and search powers by the police</a> black people remain six times more likely to be stopped; it is twice for Asian or mixed race people. Muslims being a large community within these categories fall victim of this exercise. 
The continuous negative media portrayal of the Muslim community that started with tabloid newspapers post-7/7, and has now spread widely into mainstream media after the Lee Rigby murder last year, is draining Muslim confidence. Racialisation, or rather &#8216;Islamisation&#8217;, of criminality and amplification of anything to do with Muslim and Islam are negatively affecting young Muslims who are at the sharp end of this &#8216;visibly&#8217; unfair public discourse. 
The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229211/1454.pdf" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">Annual report 2010-11</a> by the HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales observed, &#8220;Our thematic report on Muslim prisoners warned that an exclusive emphasis on combating extremism, combined with the wider media portrayals of Islam, encouraged staff to associate all Muslim prisoners with terrorism.&#8221; 
How do we stop this waste of human talent and a huge drain on our national economy? This needs a community approach as well as a wider social agenda, both from the top and from the bottom. The Muslim community, for its part, must take this as a priority and use all its resources &#8211; mosques, community and youth centres, educational and business establishments, charity sectors, etc &#8211; to combat the problem with full force. 
Support groups specialised in advice and counselling should engage with young vulnerable people to improve their quality of life and self-esteem, before they engage in criminality in the first place. They should strengthen collaboration and work with mosques and other community bodies to ease ex-offenders&#8217; transition from custody back into British society. 
Prisons chaplains should not only provide religious and spiritual service to the prisoners, but also take steps to rehabilitate and reintegrate them within wider society. 
No less important now is a need for the government to review its pervasive <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">Prevent Strategy</a> vis-a-vis Muslims and give the community a space for their civil and political dissent. Responsible journalism is needed to curb sensational media headlines on Muslims, as they create a siege atmosphere for Muslims and much angst in the wider society. 
It is time we join hands and take effective measures to beat the soaring Muslim prison population.
<pre>Image from: http://soerenkern.com/?p=4459</pre>

The Troubling Increase in Britain&#039;s Muslim Prisoners

Amid imbalanced pressures of integration in France, controversial Muslim figures enter the discourse for a French Islam 
&nbsp; 
It is widely accepted that, in France, imagining space for Islam in the public arena evokes a no-man’s land. Much ink has flown internationally on the burqa ban and debates on national identity. Francois Hollande was not spared controversy when he walked into the main Mosque of Paris on 18th February to inaugurate a memorial dedicated to the “Muslim soldier.” While on the far right Marine Le Pen qualified the initiative as ‘nauseating’ in her idiosyncratically crude idiom. The UMP accused the socialist party of electoral manipulation. Feelings were equally mitigated amongst the Muslim community, where some talked about a sound effort for national reconciliation while others reprehended the President for hiding the memorial in a citadel where only Muslims would see it. 
There is nothing particularly new about this atmosphere of discomfort. Discussing the role Muslims have or ought to have in France has become an emotionally charged political exercise. Reminiscent of the larger enterprise of western societies’ attempts to deal with the Muslim ‘other’, it has taken on a French twist in a country which still nostalgically cultivates cultural exceptionalism. Tariq Ramadan, France’s black beast, evokes the invention of a new type of citizenship, a kind of psychological status where the citizen still has to prove his integration. Different from legal obligations or language requirements, it imposes supplementary demands, falling under what recent sociologists term ‘moral citizenship’. Although the contours of this new citizenship resist precise definition, they are driven by dynamics of mistrust: loyalty, patriotism, integration and secularism are the terms which form the new textbook for the French moral citizen – probably best captured in Sarkozy’s “France: love it or leave it”.  The current socialist government’s proposal of a headscarf ban from university campuses and its treatment of the Romani issue has proven that the popularized slogan has by far crossed the boundaries of the conservative right. 
These demands of true “French-ness” are very much integrated amongst Muslims who are &#8211; not without divisions &#8211; increasingly attempting to respond to them. The French media has become flooded by features on these new movements of ‘Republican Islam’ or ‘French Islam’, in which the foundations for this new moral citizenship are being set.  Through a confused rhetoric, these groups strangely oscillate between a communitarian ‘guilt trip’ and the nostalgia of a ‘lost France’, and their Muslim counterparts are not spared. 
This trend came under the spotlight in 2011, when Hassen Chalghoumi, an Imam in a sensitive town of the Parisian outskirts, founded a conference with other Muslim representatives to promote what he termed a ‘double mission’. Firmly supporting the ban on the burqa, he exposed French Muslims’ duty to bear not only their religious identity but also their republican heritage. Portrayed as the perfect Muslim who shakes women’s hands, hyperbolically called the emissary of an “Islam of the Enlightenment” and praised by both Left and Right as a model of integration, Chalghoumi quickly became a favourite icon for both the media and the political class. 
Certainly encouraged by the sudden fame, his positions went beyond defending secularism. His speeches often echo some of the most virulent caricatures about young French-born Muslims as he goes into racially offensive alleys where only a Le Pen would be expected to walk. This is the same man who presented himself as the initiator of national reconciliation: he did not hesitate to opt for racist comments in his book where he relates his shock upon seeing his daughter’s primary class picture, asking rhetorically: “Arab, Black, Arab, Black, where are we &#8211; in Timbuktu?&#8221; 
More surprisingly, the past months have seen a resurgence of this phenomenon within the unrelated context of demonstrations against homosexual marriage, as anti-gay marriage right-wing groups did not hesitate to recruit outside mosques to join the protest. This is how Islamic associations ended up marching alongside the same groups who for years have tried to deny their communal rights and space. Themes of integration and vehement reactions about a banner in Arabic quickly came to hijack what was initially a family law-related protest. 
Camel Bechikh, president of ‘Fils de France’ (an organisation promoting a republican Islam) and member of the Union of Islamic Organizations of France, was the main spokesman during these demonstrations &#8211; a perfect platform to advocate for an acultural Islam free from ‘foreign’ attributes. 
In an interview with Rue89 after his participation in a rally organised by the Front National (France’s far-right political party) he refused to be associated with the party. However, his discourse reiterates the FN rhetoric as he highlighted the dangers of mass immigration and the need for moulding young people from immigrant descent into ‘good patriots’. For Bechikh, this would consist not in rejecting one’s origins but appeasing them &#8211; he goes as far as suggesting that Islamic skullcaps could become berets and headscarves replaced by bandanas. 
Although these groups have been under vivid criticism, they continue to federate – even if one may argue that they remain mere instruments of political calculus for diverse parties. Above all, they contribute to showing that the conflict on the national level, highlighted by events such as the inauguration of the memorial of the Muslim soldier, has now very much expanded to the communities themselves. Beyond unilateral discourses of national reconciliation between the French state and its Muslims citizens, it is among the divided Muslims themselves that a dialogue needs to be established. Under the burden of integration, temptations to ‘fit in’ have led some of them to paradoxically become leaders of France’s disturbing normalised Islamophobia.
<pre>Image from: http://mideastposts.com/middle-east-society/religion-in-the-middle-east/common-ground-in-the-doha-debate-on-the-burqa-ban/</pre>

Fighting for French Islam: Integration to Islamophobia?

In Tower Hamlets&#8217; historic tradition of challenging racism and fascism, a planned EDL march through the London borough will not go unchallenged 
&nbsp; 
After their failed attempts over the last few years to march through Tower Hamlets the far-right and rabidly anti-Muslim <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Defence_League" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">English Defence League</a> (EDL) is determined to march again into the borough this Saturday (7 September). This despite a police ban on direct entry into Tower Hamlets (their demonstration must end at Aldgate) and a pending court appearance by EDL&#8217;s Stephen Lennon after his last failed attempt to stir up trouble in the area. 
This time the EDL is also facing a formidable and united community in the East End. In fact, the EDL threat has united Tower Hamlets&#8217; community as a fortress against far right fascism, continuing a long tradition of resistance to fascism that harks back to the days of Cable Street. 
After the EDL&#8217;s last major attempt to march in 2011 local community groups came together to form United East End (UEE). The UEE held a major rally in June to <a href="http://www.eastlondonadvertiser.co.uk/news/politics/rally_to_keep_out_edl_by_united_east_end_after_woolwich_attack_on_soldier_1_2244119" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">&#8216;keep the EDL out&#8217;</a> in the wake of the Lee Rigby murder. This time the EDL will be countering strong opposition from a Tower Hamlets community that includes Muslims, trades unions, people of different faiths (and none), and thousands of those committed to living a peaceful life in this fast-changing corner of London. Anti-fascist groups are going to organise a peaceful community event to express their revulsion against the EDL in the historic <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Altab_Ali_Park" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">Altab Ali Park</a> (named in memory of Altab Ali, a 25-year-old Bangladeshi clothing worker, who was murdered by white racists on 4 May 1978 as he walked home from work). 
The police have also imposed <a href="http://www.eastlondonadvertiser.co.uk/news/politics/police_slap_public_order_restrictions_on_edl_s_saturday_march_in_east_end_1_2365777" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">Public Order restrictions on the EDL&#8217;s Saturday march</a> limiting the group&#8217;s presence to the fringes of the borough; the Met says it will have a robust arrest policy &#8220;to prevent serious disorder, damage to property, disruption to community life and intimidation&#8221;. 
The EDL march will be restricted between 12 noon and 3pm and has to follow a defined route, starting south of Tower Bridge, along The Minories and Aldgate High Street, not going beyond the corner of Mansell Street. It has already been barred from using Whitechapel&#8217;s Altab Ali Park by Tower Hamlets Council. This means hopefully the EDL and anti-fascist groups will not meet anywhere nearby. 
However, people in Tower Hamlets did really want a ban on the EDL march this year for fear of major confrontation and violence. A petition signed by 10,000 people was submitted to the Home Secretary asking the government to ban the EDL presence in Tower Hamlets. Two local MPs, Rushanara Ali and Jim Fitzpatrick, wrote to Police Minister Damian Green <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/edl-march-tower-hamlets-mps-ban-lee-rigby" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">calling for a ban on the EDL march</a>. Tower Hamlets&#8217; elected Mayor, Lutfur Rahman, also requested a meeting with the Home Secretary to call on her to ban the march, but <a href="http://www.eastlondonadvertiser.co.uk/news/politics/edl_march_likely_as_tower_hamlets_mayor_snubbed_by_home_secretary_1_2364640" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">he was snubbed by the Government</a>. The Government response has been rather lacklustre in the face of such determined community calls. 
Since its inception in 2009 the EDL has orchestrated a series of demonstrations, some violent, targeting mosques across the country. It has exploited Lee Rigby&#8217;s horrific murder on 22 May by stepping up its hostility against Muslims: more than 100 EDL thugs descended <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1094514/woolwich-riot-police-contain-edl-supporters" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">on Woolwich the very night Lee was killed</a>, causing widespread mayhem and attacking police. Many EDL Facebook supporters (which swelled in number following Lee Rigby&#8217;s murder) called for attacks on Muslims and mosques. Indeed, a number of mosques have sadly now been subject to arson attacks, with all the hall mark of EDL-inspired fanatics about them. It is sad to think that a group claiming to oppose and expose extremism should so ironically contain and foster such extremism within its own ranks. An Islamic centre in north London, run by the Somali Bravanese Welfare Association, <a href="hthttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-22785074tp://" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">was destroyed by a fire</a> in an apparent hate crime attack; the letters EDL were sprayed on to the building whilst bombs were let off outside mosques in Walsall, Tipton and Wolverhampton. The anti-Muslim hate crime monitoring service, <a href="http://tellmamauk.org/" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">Tell MAMA</a>, noted a large spike in online abuse targeting Muslims since Woolwich too, with several men and women found guilty of enticing mosque arson over social media. 
The EDL thrives on hatred and vilification of the Muslim community. Its leaders, Stephen Lennon and his cousin Kevin Carroll, have made Tower Hamlets their main target because of its large Muslim population and the presence of London&#8217;s oldest mosque (established in 1910), the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_London_Mosque" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">East London Mosque</a>, and Britain&#8217;s biggest Muslim community complex in Whitechapel. Unfortunately, it gets ammunition from some right wing journalists and bloggers who, for the last few years, have been demonising Muslims in this part of the world. 
Yet the East End has been historically opposed to racism and fascism, notably since the &#8216;<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cable_Street" target="_hplink" rel="noopener noreferrer">Battle of Cable Street&#8217;</a> on Sunday 4 October in 1936 when a march by the British Union of Fascists, led by Oswald Mosley, was countered by anti-fascists that included local Jewish and Irish communities. We are continuing in that noble tradition. Then, as now, the people of the East End will see it through. By socio-economic standards the borough may be at the bottom of the deprivation list, but its legacy to fight fascism remains remarkably strong.
<pre>Image from: <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/05/28/edl-spoof-facts_n_3345503.html">http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/05/28/edl-spoof-facts_n_3345503.html</a></pre>

A New &#039;Battle of Cable Street&#039;

Faith and conviction cannot be burnt by the flames of hatred. 
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&#8220;We should not allow the murder of Lee Rigby to come between Londoners. The unified response we have seen to his death across all communities will triumph over those who seek to divide us&#8221;, said Met Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe, matching his determination with a decision to increase <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22833138">24-hour police patrols around potentially &#8220;vulnerable&#8221; locations</a>. 
This has reassured London’s wary Muslim population and given a pointed message to potential perpetrators of further attacks on Muslim places in our great city of London. 
This decisive step comes after fire-fighters were called to a Darul Uloom boarding school in Chislehurst in south-east London in the early hours of 9 June, the second suspicious fire within a week; almost 130 pupils and staff were evacuated from the religious seminary. 
The first fire on 5 June <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jun/05/fire-islamic-community-centre-muswell-hill">flattened an Islamic centre</a>, run by the Somali Bravanese community in Muswell Hill in north London. The centre was used by the younger generation as a place for learning, as well as by members of the local community for social interaction and physical and spiritual development. Since the shocking incidence the community has been deeply touched by the overwhelming messages of support from local neighbours, politicians, community associations, faith, interfaith and non-faith organisations, as well as numerous individuals. 
In our recent visit to the burned down centre we were heartened to see a unique community spirit that has brought people together. The Chairman, traumatised by the destruction of the complex, was full of praise for the London Fire Brigade who took appropriate steps to prevent the fire spreading to neighbours and the Metropolitan Police for laudably reassuring the local community with their physical presence. He was resolute when he said: “Together we will not let this tragic incident divide us. We have lost an important building in our community, but we will remain strong and steadfast and, with the help of all those who have supported us, we will rebuild our community centre. It will once again become a beacon for cohesion, social action and friendship.&#8221; 
Faith and conviction cannot be burnt by the flames of hatred. 
With Lee Rigby murder on 22 May our country faces two major political and social challenges of our time that need tough handling by all of us, the government and citizens, with resolve and wisdom – one, the utter criminality cloaked under the guise of politics or religion by a few deranged individuals in the periphery of the Muslim community who are putting the whole community on the dock; and secondly, the violent response from far right activists that frightens Muslims and divisive narrative by some columnists that poisons ordinary people’s mind against the Muslim community.  Both are dangerous and they need to be challenged head on; they feed on each other. 
Lee Rigby’s killers were known to be linked with the extremist group (Al-Muhajiroun) that was banned a few years ago. The group re-emerges in variant forms with the same message of hate and as far as I am aware, mosques and Islamic centres up and down the country are a ‘no go area’ for this group; the Muslim community has ostracised them, but sadly some of our national media provide them with disproportionate oxygen of publicity for probably offering sensational news to people. 
On the other hand, the far right group (English Defence League) that emerged in 2009 with some football hooligans had organised series of violent protests against mosques across the country. Thankfully, they have also been ostracised by the mainstream society and the political establishment. 
In order to defeat this twin-menace w e need to be careful on our words and language; they matter, especially if they come from senior public figures. Our former Prime Minister Tony Blair who has a strong ideological view on Muslim issues (“There is a problem within Islam&#8230;”) has recently made a ‘<a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2334560/The-ideology-Lee-Rigbys-murder-profound-dangerous-Why-dont-admit--Tony-Blair-launches-brave-assault-Muslim-extremism-Woolwich-attack.html#ixzz2VGoQwp1X">brave assault on Muslim Extremism after Woolwich attack’</a>; this has the potential of further undermining the positive work done by the Muslim community and also giving ammunition to the far right group. Tony Blair took us to a disastrous war against the will of majority British people in 2003; he, according to Prof John Esposito from Georgetown University in Washington, has <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-faith/wp/2013/06/05/is-islamic-terrorism-a-problem-with-religion-or-politics/">misread Muslim terrorism</a>. 
The root cause that separate people in any society is ignorance that leads to fear of unknown. The local communities across the country generally get on well with one another, due to the fact that there is a lesser amount of ignorance among them and more public interaction in their daily life. They are served by the local police, religious or community centres and other civic organisations. 
But, nationally and regionally, we very much need to find creative ways to bring our diverse people together. Pragmatic political decisions by our politicians, more constructive role by our media and judicious comments by powerful individuals are what we need today to spread the message of realistic hope and allay fear of others; we all have a duty to dispel myths surrounding other communities. This needs a clear strategy and inclusive approach by people in authority &#8211; political and civil, Muslims and non-Muslims, religious and non-religious. 
Downplaying the seriousness of violent extremism or retaliatory anti-Muslim prejudice by any will be a grave mistake.
<pre>Image from: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/06/05/mosque-set-on-fire-edl-attack_n_3389136.html</pre>

Islamophobia and Violent Extremism: Tackling the Twin-Menace Head On

Depending on the language used, reactions to recent tensions in the British community may have drastic consequences 
  
York Mosque has taken a leading role in showing how to quench potential violence. In a week that has seen <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/woolwich-backlash-ten-attacks-on-mosques-since-murder-of-drummer-lee-rigby-8633594.html">many attacks to mosques</a> since the brutal Woolwich murder, the York community opened the doors and welcomed around 100 people for <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/may/27/york-mosque-protest-tea-biscuits">tea and a game of football</a>. Having heard that the EDL were planning a demonstration, they had made plans to react proactively. “If you want to get to know people you talk to them”, <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/woolwich-two-arrested-over-grimsby-islamic-centre-fire">said Abid Salik</a>, the Imam of the mosque.  “That’s the beauty of community.” 
Following York mosque’s example a Facebook group was set up. The <a href="https://www.facebook.com/TeaDeeL">Tea Defence League</a> has had over 1000 likes in 24 hours. “There isn&#8217;t much you can&#8217;t sort out over a nice cuppa”, say the makers of the group. “Organise your own Tea Party and invite people for a chat, like the folks at the York Mosque did with the EDL.” 
It is perhaps not surprising that the mosque’s proactive approach has made it to the headlines. Much like the image of EDL chief Tommy Robinson and Muslim political commentator Mohammed Ansar <a href="http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/woolwich-attack-english-defence-league-1912413">sharing a hug</a>, the “Muslims inviting the EDL to tea” invokes a Huntington theory-like symbol of two clashing ‘civilisations’ sharing an odd moment of truce. No doubt that many mosques have taken to closing their doors, guarding their entrances and acting with general paranoia—a defensive reaction against the backlash of angry protestors who were rightly shocked over the Woolwich attack, but who misguidedly pinned the blame on Islam. Although it is unfair that mosques have become gathering places for EDL protests, barricading the doors is simply a preventative measure which does not provide any long-term solutions. In light of the discourse about Islamophobia and the tense relationship between Muslims and wider British society, Britain is now at a tipping point and needs some solutions. 
In 1997, the <a href="http://www.runnymedetrust.org/projects/commissionOnBritishMuslims">Runnymede Trust</a> established a commission on British Muslims to identify and analyse the growing hostility towards Muslims in British society; what incidents are taking place, and why have tensions flared up in the last decade? This report, titled Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, reveals that “Islamophobic discourse, sometimes blatant but frequently coded and subtle”, is part of “everyday life in modern Britain”. It defines Islamophobia as “unfounded hostility towards Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most Muslims”. 
Many people attribute the rise of Islamophobia in British society to the increased visibility of Muslims in public life, especially since the publication of Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses in 1988. This event, dubbed The Rushdie Affair, is so important in understanding the development of Muslim identity in Britain and many academic books have been written analysing its repercussions and resonance on current debates about Islam. At the time, the image of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/9523983/The-Satanic-Verses-and-me.html">book-burning British Muslims</a> became a symbol in the West for Muslim anger. It raised several questions about the relationship of Muslims and the West and questioned the limits of tolerance and freedom of speech. Yet Muslims are demographically a young community, many were not born when the incident happened, or were too young to remember it. For young Muslims, the repercussions of the Rushdie Affair is the beginning of a cumulative string of events (including 9/11 and 7/7) which have integrated the term ‘Islamophobia’ into our discourse. 
Yet the term has several problems which cannot be overlooked. Perhaps the most obvious problem is the difficulty in finding a word that fairly and accurately describes the issues at hand. Like the terms ‘homophobia’ and ‘xenophobia’ the implication of the word ‘phobia’ is misleading, because it implies an irrational fear of something. Those accused of ‘Islamophobic’ behaviour often argue that their criticism of Islam does not stem from irrational fears but from genuine critique of the religion. Consequently the term has a stifling effect on debate. 
Linked to this problem is the fact that it does not capture the scale or extent of the anti-Muslim sentiment it describes. A person who disagrees with a certain aspect of Islam, such as the strict dress code of women, could be painted with the same brush as a journalist who declares that all Muslims are terrorists. There is a clear difference, yet finding a term which encompasses the scope of anti-Muslim sentiment in British society is practically impossible.  Moreover, when the term ‘Islamophobia’ is employed too frequently by Muslims, there is a risk that it starts to perpetuate a victim mentality, encouraging a defensive stance rather than proactive engagement with society. 
But despite problems with its definition, the term has gained legitimacy and emotional power and is here to stay. <a href="http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/book-reviews/14631-pointing-the-finger-islam-and-muslims-in-the-british-media">Research</a> has shown that its principal manifestations are hostility and negativity in the media and blogosphere, as well as in hate crimes and violence in the street. 
In response to such negativity, Muslims should not succumb to playing the victim or barricading their doors.  I’m not saying that putting on a kettle and inviting protestors to tea will solve all our problems. But York mosque and the Tea Defence League’s Facebook group—however light-hearted its message may appear on the surface— reaffirms an important but oft-forgotten saying: “Peace cannot be achieved through violence, it can only be attained through understanding.” 
Image from: http://01varvara.wordpress.com/2008/04/22/aleksei-naumov-drinking-tea-1896/ 
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