In-person screenings and gala events are back at this year’s <a href="https://whatson.bfi.org.uk/lff/Online/default.asp">BFI London Film Festival</a> (6 to 17 October) after last year’s online event. This time, you can watch your festival picks at London’s South Bank and West End cinemas, with a number of viewings expanding across the country. Tickets are on sale now, and The Platform’s Louis Bayman and Halima Hassan are here to tell us what to look out for.
If you’re in the mood for a headliner, there are plenty of star-studded events each year at the festival, and here are four of the big releases we’re looking forward to:
<h5>THE FRENCH DISPATCH 
Dir. Wes Anderson (USA)</h5>
Described as a “star-studded homage to journalism and literary magazines”, The French Dispatch is also the name of a high-brow magazine that’s reached the end of its run. Sharp, weird and aesthetically pleasing is what I’ve come to expect from Wes Anderson – and from the trailer, it looks like this film will deliver. Granted, there are many ways Anderson’s films may not be for everyone, with odd storylines and unrepresentative casts leaving much to desire. But I don&#8217;t need representation all the time and fantasy is fun. – HH
<h5>SPENCER 
Dir. Pablo Larrain (UK / Germany)</h5>
Kristen Stewart stars in this drama about the late Diana Spencer, aka Princess of Wales. Director Pablo Larraìn’s previous films include explorations of Pinochet-era Chile and a recently widowed Jackie Kennedy. That promises to make this a thoughtful and politically astute contribution to the ‘90s nostalgia that has recently been gathering pace. – LB 
<h5>THE HARDER THEY FALL 
Dir. Jeymes Samuel (USA)</h5>
I have found myself enamoured with all things relating to the American West. Stories of outlaws and cowboys, operating in a lawless time so vastly different from our hyper-surveilled present. The Harder They Fall is inspired by the real-life stories of African-American cowboys and features an incredible cast (Idris Elba, Regina King, LaKeith Stanfield). I am expecting something epic and beautiful and satisfying. – HH
<h5>LAST NIGHT IN SOHO 
Dir. Diana Rigg (UK)</h5>
Although it played to a standing ovation by critics at the Venice Film Festival, I don’t quite know what this sci-fi/horror hybrid by Shaun of the Dead director Edgar Wright will hold in store. But it promises to get its audience high on style and atmosphere with a time-travel plot that travels back to the Soho clubs of London in 1966. The ensemble cast is worth the price of admission alone, starring Anya Taylor-Joy but also showcasing Rita Tushingham, Terence Stamp and Diana Rigg in her last ever role. – LB
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last-night-in-soho

Last-Night-in-Soho

Away from the noise of the red carpet here, are a few personal critics’ choices:
<h5>RED ROCKET 
Dir: Sean Baker (USA)</h5>
Director/Writer Sean Baker’s third feature’s premise is an uncomfortable one but I’m hopeful considering how his debut (Tangerine) and sophomore (The Florida Project) films are some of my favourites. A once successful LA porn star goes back to his old ways and his ex-wife, and finds himself fixated on an underage girl who he decides should join him for his adult movie comeback. I’m curious to see what this film is about. – HH
<h5>IL BUCO 
Dir. Michelangelo Frammartino (Italy / Germany / France)</h5>
This film is in the official competition for an award for best film. While I would think a film about speleology – cave-mapping – is probably a bit too left-field to win, it offers a rhythmic, poetic view from the mountains of southern Italy. Director Michelangelo Frammartino last film, Le quattro volte, was similarly a tale of goat-herding mountain-dwellers that hovered somewhere between documentary and art installation with one single word – ‘grazie’ – in its hour and a half runtime. A bold filmmaker returning with a unique vision. – LB
<h5>ENCOUNTER 
Dir. Michael Pearce (USA / UK)</h5>
Science fiction x Riz Ahmed?! Sign me up. Something strange is afoot and Riz Ahmed’s character, a war-veteran, is in the know and desperate to warn his family of the danger (an impending alien invasion!). – HH
<h5>THE SOUVENIR II 
Dir. Joanna Hogg (UK)</h5>
An autobiographical tale of her own ‘80s art school experiences and a slow, almost plotless reverie on disappointment, Joanna Hogg’s The Souvenir wouldn’t really strike us as the typical film to make a franchise out of. The title sounds to me like deliberate provocation from a director whose scrutiny is always on the awkwardness of the deficiencies of the upper-middle classes. Hogg’s attention on the most privileged sections of British society is too narrow a perspective for some viewers, but she always succeeds in wreaking a devastation that is all the more effective for its quietness.  – LB

the-harder-they-fall

THE HARDER THEY FALL

Last but not least, we’ve picked a few titles especially for The Platform’s readers. Here are some of the politically conscious films with a global reach at this year’s London Film Festival:
<h5>THE GRAVEDIGGER’S WIFE 
Dir. Khadar Ayderus Ahmed (Finland / France / Germany)</h5>
This film is directed by Somali filmmaker Khadar Ahmed and stars a Somali cast. It follows Guled, played by Omar Abdi, a gravedigger whose wife falls ill. To raise the money for her treatment, he is forced to leave his ailing wife in the care of their son to seek the help from his community. Filmed in Djibouti, I cannot wait to see this story set in East Africa, with East African leads. I think it’ll be an exciting and important addition to the African film canon. – HH
<h5>A HERO 
Dir. Asghar Farhadi (Iran / France)</h5>
Asghar Farhadi is already well known to international audiences, winning the Oscar for Best Foreign Film in 2011 with The Separation and then refusing to travel to the ceremony in 2017 for The Salesman in protest against Trump’s Muslim ban. He specialises in family dramas whose moments of acute personal crises still succeed in drawing a broader picture of contemporary Iranian society. This should particularly be the case in his latest film, where a man in debtors’ prison tries to confront his creditor. – LB
<h5>ALL THESE SONS 
Dir. Bing Liu and Joshua Altman (USA)</h5>
All These Sons is a documentary about two Chicago organisations, The Inner City Muslim Action Network (IMAN) and MAAFA, which recruit young Black men to get them off the streets and tackle gun violence. I’m interested in this documentary from a reform and prevention perspective. – HH
<h5>LEAVE NO TRACES 
Dir. Jan P. Matuszyński (France / Poland / Czechia)</h5>
This Polish film is set amid the military dictatorship in 1983 and concerns the killing of a student by security forces. This will be a new discovery for me, as I am not familiar with its cast and crew. However its historical investigation into not just one act of violence, but the whole system that sustains it, has brought comparisons with classic Polish filmmaker Andrzej Wajda and that’s enough to get me interested! – LB

the_gravediggers_wife_-copy

The_gravediggers_wife_ copy

The BFI London Film Festival takes place <a href="https://whatson.bfi.org.uk/lff/Online/default.asp">6 to 17 October 2021</a>. 
HH – Halima A. Hassan 
LB – Louis Bayman

a-hero-farhadi

Louis Bayman and Halima Hassan preview the BFI London Film Festival of 2021 as it returns to cinemas this year.

Our Critics’ Picks for the BFI London Film Festival 2021

As international players vie for power in the Middle East, the future of Syria is more uncertain than ever 
&nbsp; 
Four-and-a-half years have passed since the first bullet was fired on peaceful protestors marching for democratic reforms in Syria. Spurred on by the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the context of the Arab Spring sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa at the time, Syrians had come out onto the streets in their droves, calling for the end of 40 years of dictatorship by the Assad family. 
Today, however, the picture in <a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/2013/09/26/the-syrian-civil-war-sectarian-violence-political-agendas-and-paths-to-peace/">Syria is more complex</a>. What began as a revolution in early 2011 has evolved into an international war, with foreign players and their proxies all vying for their own interests in the region. As the conflict escalates to involve neighbouring states, the Syrian people who once dared dream of a brighter future, now find themselves under siege on all fronts. In short, the Syrian revolution has been hijacked and the future of Syria is now at the mercy of a new Cold War between the US and Russia. 
On 30th September, Russian fighter jets began bombing territories held by the Syrian opposition just hours after lawmakers in Moscow approved an aerial campaign targeting militants belonging to the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), which took advantage of the security vacuum and seized swathes of land in the country in 2013. 
The US has already been leading a coalition of more than 60 nations against the militants in both Syria and Iraq for a year, and has been in discussions with Russia on how to coordinate their parallel operations against this common enemy in order to avoid <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/us-mideast-syria-russia-idUSKCN0RB0ZD20150911">&#8220;unintended incidents&#8221;</a>. Although Washington and Moscow are agreed on the need to fight IS, disagreements on Syrian regime leader <a href="http://beta.trtworld.com/americas/obama-says-assad-must-go-for-isis-to-be-defeated-8635">Bashar al-Assad&#8217;s role</a> in a transition phase to end the war prevents them from fighting together. 
While Russia insists on including Assad in the country&#8217;s future, the US says that propping up the Assad regime – which is responsible for most of the <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/assads-government-still-kills-way-more-civilians-than-isis-2015-2">quarter of a million confirmed deaths</a> in this war – will only worsen the conflict. However, there is a stark difference in the US stance towards this war today compared to the summer of 2013, when US warships gathered in the eastern Mediterranean in preparation for a possible assault on regime positions after a chemical attack on the opposition-held Damascus suburb of Ghouta, allegedly carried out by regime forces. 
US intervention may have originally been averted when Assad complied to Russian president Vladimir Putin&#8217;s proposal that he surrender his chemical arsenal to the international community, but when IS broke through the Sykes-Picot border dividing Syria and Iraq the following year, the entire narrative of the war changed, as the growing threat of Islamist extremism in the region gave Washington the justification to launch airstrikes. Assad was no longer the primary concern. 
Russia also cited the threat of IS as their reason to conduct airstrikes in Syria, but evidence increasingly suggests Russian airstrikes are instead targeting moderate opposition groups in areas where there is <a href="http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/30/russia-says-it-has-begun-airstrikes-in-syria.html">little to no IS presence</a>. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov later admitted that airstrikes are targeting other terrorist groups in addition to IS. Unfortunately, his explanation wasn&#8217;t very enlightening: “If it looks like a terrorist, if it acts like a terrorist, if it walks like a terrorist, if it fights like a terrorist, it&#8217;s a terrorist, right?&#8221; 
In other words, Moscow is in actual fact defining all forces opposed to the regime as a legitimate target for its aerial campaign. Although Lavrov denied <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/01/us-mideast-crisis-lavrov-fsa-idUSKCN0RV51620151001">Russia considered the Free Syrian Army (FSA)</a> a terrorist organisation and insisted on their participation in the transition phase, US Senator John McCain confirmed that FSA-affiliated groups that had been trained and equipped by the US had indeed been hit. Russian airstrikes have also targeted the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/world/middleeast/syria-russia-airstrikes-rebels-army-conquest-jaish-al-fatah.html?_r=0">Army of Conquest</a>, a coalition of local Islamist factions plus the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, which has controlled the north-western province of Idlib near the Turkish border since March. 
While the Nusra Front has <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/10/us-mideast-crisis-syria-nusra-idUSKCN0QF0WP20150810">reportedly been withdrawing</a> from the Turkish border in order to focus more on their battles in other areas with Hezbollah – Iran’s Lebanon-based proxy which is fighting on the side of the Assad regime – the factions left behind in Idlib are mainly considered moderate groups also opposed to IS. However, the failure of the US and its allies to offer sufficient support to the FSA from the onset of the war resulted in many <a href="http://news.nationalpost.com/news/moderate-syrian-rebels-defecting-to-isis-blaming-lack-of-u-s-support-and-weapons">moderate fighters turning</a> to more extreme groups as the only means to topple Assad. All that is left of the FSA is a bunch of <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/fsa.htm">loosely aligned brigades</a>, bound not so much by a central command as they are by a common objective. 
Moscow, on the other hand, has been unwavering in its support for Assad, for it is the Assad regime and its Alawite stronghold in Syria&#8217;s coastal provinces that is guaranteeing Russia&#8217;s presence in the region via its only Mediterranean naval repair base in the port of Tartus. Russia is said to be expanding its naval facility as well as building an airstrip in Latakia&#8217;s Bassel al-Assad airbase. 
Iran is also seeking to create a <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-occupies-iraq-1426116089">corridor to Damascus and the Mediterranean</a> via the Shiite-dominated Iraqi central government in Baghdad. Commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, along with Hezbollah, have long been reinforcing the regime to secure access to the strategic Beqaa Valley, which leads to the Mediterranean. As Russia continues its assault from the skies, Iran is reportedly boosting its presence in Syria with hundreds of troops arriving in the country to commence a ground offensive against the opposition. 
What will be left of Syria once this is all over is still unclear. There is a chance that the US, Russia and their respective allies in the region may have covertly agreed on its division along sectarian lines, especially in light of the recent nuclear deal achieved between Iran and the west. 
Alternatively, this may be a plot by the US to get Russia involved in another campaign similar to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, by setting them up for a long and costly war. By targeting moderate opposition groups, Russia risks giving legitimacy to extreme groups like IS, who seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of disillusioned Sunni Muslims in the region by <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2786039/The-1-300-year-old-apocalyptic-prophecy-predicted-war-Islamic-army-infidel-horde-Syria-fuelling-ISIS-s-brutal-killers.html">romanticising their struggle</a> as a resistance against infidel crusaders. The Russian Orthodox Church describing the campaign as &#8220;holy&#8221; certainly doesn&#8217;t help the matter. 
Nonetheless, Russia&#8217;s vision of a democratic Syria in which Assad is willing to share power with, in Putin&#8217;s words, a &#8220;healthy opposition&#8221;, would probably be no better than Ramzan Kadyrov&#8217;s puppet regime in Chechnya, where all credible opposition is silenced. If Syria is to remain united, it is unlikely Assad will stay in power while he has the blood of 250,000 people on his hands. Assad may be forced to cede power to an opposition that is willing to cooperate with Russia and Iran, but how representative his replacement will be of the Syrian people is highly debatable. 
The Syrian people have sacrificed too much for them to return to the days of dictatorship or settle for circus democracy now. Until the nations of the world reform their ways and start placing human beings above their selfish interests, this war will continue, it will escalate, it will spread and generations from now it will be recorded in history books not as a war, but as a genocide against a people who only had one demand – freedom.
<pre>Image from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/10/us-mideast-crisis-syria-nusra-idUSKCN0QF0WP20150810</pre>

Russia&#039;s Vision for Syria: A Transition With or Without Assad?

Support for President Bashar al-Assad continues on from a long tradition of Syrian nationalism and loyalty to the regime 
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Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in early 2011, much has been written about the developing political and humanitarian situation. Being married to a Syrian and spending much of my time with Syrians, both inside and outside of the country, I have been a keen follower of events in the country and have often found the coverage on both sides to be either misinformed or disingenuous. 
Given that the majority of the Syrians that I am in regular contact with support the government of President Assad, one subject I have paid close attention to over the last three years has been the motivation behind continued support of the regime. I would like to stress that the purpose of this article is not to discuss the extent of this support base, as such estimates are hard to substantiate at present. Instead, I want to examine why a sizable portion of Syrian society continues to hold a pro-governmental stance. 
Regular observers of mainstream coverage of the crisis will be well acquainted with the standard narrative regarding government loyalists. This narrative suggests that governmental support comes from Syria’s diverse range of religious minorities, backed up by a rich Sunni elite closely aligned to the regime. This crude and shallow analysis does contain some truth, as religious minorities and Sunni elites are largely, although not exclusively, supportive of the regime. However, a plethora of motivations can be found to explain why the government retains support from members of all sections of society. 
Although many Syrians do have a genuine fear of the fall of a government, the suggestion that this is simply due to fears of persecution of minority groups at the hands of an alternative regime, or due to fear of economic loss, is seriously misleading. Such views do not explain why many members of the Sunni minority continue to voice their own support of the regime, nor does it explain why non-elites also maintain the same political stance. Instead, other factors contribute to fear of the downfall of President Assad. 
Despite its numerous faults, the current regime is seen as having ensured stability and security in a region in which its neighbours have seen ongoing war and conflict. The chaos of post-Saddam Iraq in particular, serves as an example as to what many believe might follow any regime change in Syria. Many Syrians view the American-led removal of Saddam as having had mainly negative consequences for Iraq that they do not wish to see occur in Syria. The breakdown of state infrastructure as occurred in Iraq is of particular concern and rebel fighters have already employed tactics aimed at sabotaging this infrastructure. Not only have the Syrian rebels attacked larger government institutions, such as power stations and hospitals, but they have also attacked street level institutions, including government bakeries and post offices, often attacking employees. Such tactics have demonstrated the rebels’ non-suitability to take power for themselves and the failure of exiled politicians to reign in such rebel activities, and as such, has led many to reject them. 
The lack of a credible alternative to Assad’s Ba’ath Party is a key issue in seeking to explain his continuing support base. The current alternatives consist almost exclusively of Islamist rebels, many with openly declared sympathies to Al-Qaeda and exiled political figures. A significant proportion of these groups are believed to be made up of foreign nationals. Like so much in Syria these days, the exact percentage of foreign fighters in rebel ranks remains unclear, as conducting proper research on the ground is highly problematic. But whether it is true or not, the government has been successful in portraying the struggle as one of sovereignty: Syrians against foreigners. Consequently, many equate supporting Bashar with supporting Syria and supporting the rebels as being unpatriotic. 
Nonetheless, were one able to conclusively demonstrate that the rebels are exclusively Syrian, Islamist fighters and the ideology they publically profess are unlikely to ever provide an attractive alternative for a significant proportion of Syrian society, due to the nation’s closer ties with secularism and differing interpretations of Islam. As for the exiled political opposition, they have likewise done little to win popular support on the ground. For Syrians genuinely seeking democratic representation, questions may be asked as to where organisations such as the Syrian National Coalition draw their legitimacy from. Few doubt that organisations such as the coalition are heavily influenced by their sponsors in the Western and the Persian Gulf, which also plays to Assad’s ‘us versus them’ narrative. Furthermore, it appears that few Syrians, pro- or anti-regime, have any awareness of who these people are, let alone of their political credentials. The coalition has also proven itself as inept at controlling the rebel forces they supposedly represent. 
Another key issue that has been overlooked during the crisis is the genuine and long-standing support that the regime enjoyed from a significant proportion of the country. This may come as a surprise to many, not just in light of misinformed media coverage, but also in terms of common western understandings of dictatorial regimes. 
I remember moving to Syria in 2008, firm in my understanding that authoritarian, dictatorial governments are despised by their people. I was shocked to find that Bashar al-Assad was a well-respected, popular leader. Suspecting that displays of affection for the government might be the result of a ‘big brother’ culture, I sought out the opinions of friends at times in which it would be safe for them to speak. Despite often making comments on a number of issues that may have landed them in trouble, President Assad was still praised as a good leader who reflected the will of the people, particularly regarding foreign policy. I can safely say that this popular support was not restricted to sectarian affiliation, religiosity or economic standing, but was instead reflected by people of all walks of society. Some of those whom I know in Syria have since revised their opinion of President Assad and the government as a whole &#8211; however, many have not. If anything, their support for Assad has grown in the last three years. 
So long as the previously mentioned factors remain, significant support for President Assad’s government is likely to continue. Neither the organised political opposition, nor rebel fighters, have successfully managed to satisfy the fears of government supporters, nor have they made attempts to offer Syrians the positives that are associated with the regime.
<pre>Image from: http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02422/pro_2422238b.jpg</pre>

Syria’s Once (and Twice) Loved President

As the Iraqi parliamentary election approaches, many hyperbolic perceptions remain to be defied 
  
Once again, Fallujah is the centre of a political crisis in Iraq, with al-Qaeda linked militants said to be in control of the city. The Iraqi government has been supplied with plenty of military aid to back its oversized army against the militants, but the stand-off reveals much about Iraq’s problems. Given recent news coverage, one might be forgiven for thinking that Iraq was actually a Tehran-controlled puppet deeply divided by sectarian beliefs and overrun with al-Qaeda insurgents from Syria. The stand-off in Fallujah reveals at least five things that require further discussion while defying those irrational notions. 
&nbsp; 
Iraq still suffers more from a democratic deficit rather than an Islamist influx 
Tribes-people of Fallujah, not just al-Qaeda, have played a role in keeping the Iraqi army out of the city. There are civilians there who are genuinely dissatisfied with the work of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s government and thus do not want anything to do with it. 
The promise of democracy in Iraq has limped along to the tune of al-Maliki politicking to achieve greater power by bribing people with coveted jobs and having his political opponents arrested. 
Iraq is currently ranked 150th out of 179 countries in the Press Freedom Index, and in 2013, the Iraqi government banned ten news channels, including Al-Jazeera, for allegedly stirring up sectarian conflict. 
Although Iraq’s pan-Arab press by nature has foreign influence, it would be foolish to assume that credible journalists are merely puppets for media moguls with sectarian interests – if there even is such a thing. 
Furthermore, the Saddamist style of rule by inclusion and exclusion had a greater influence than many care to notice when discussing Iraq. De-Ba’athification may have alienated many of Saddam Hussein’s former colleagues but it did not eliminate the legacy he left behind. Islamic tribes that threatened to weaken Hussein were either bribed with the opportunity to gain extra influence or violently oppressed. Many groups seeking political influence in Iraq still play up to this method of getting things done, and al-Maliki is not one to pass up the opportunity of being the leader who people either cherish or fear. 
Hussein’s legacy left an imprint on Iraq of a political tradition upheld by the inclusion of some groups at the expense of excluding others. 
&nbsp; 
US foreign policy is at risk of repeating itself 
In the past few weeks, the U.S. administration has stepped up its delivery of surveillance drones and missiles to Iraq in response to the Fallujah stand-off, and is one rebellious senator short of <a href="http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/08/congress-to-iraq-s-maliki-no-arms-for-a-civil-war.html">selling Iraq dozens of Apache helicopters</a>. 
U.S. foreign policy is at risk of propping up a bad leader and irresponsible government because of an irrational fear that al-Qaeda could take over Iraq. 
Al-Maliki’s administration is continuously emboldened by U.S. funding as Saddam Hussein once was. 
&nbsp; 
Groups linked to al-Qaeda do not have control over Fallujah 
As the Sons of Iraq campaign, which took place in Fallujah in 2006, proved, anyone fighting alongside al-Qaeda can be turned. Fallujah is not a Tolkienesque battleground between good and evil. It should be a political arena for the government to demonstrate that democracy can produce what the people really want: employment, clean water, and electricity. 
Instead, Fallujah is an act of defiance. Many of its citizens have left to escape a potential Apache helicopter attack and selective persecution by their own elected government, while others have prevented the Iraqi army from entering the city. 
It is the Iraqi government that has ultimate control over Fallujah but its failure to identify and resolve its own shortcomings will continue to give the upper hand to any old demagogue with his own militia. 
Meanwhile, Syria has managed to get much credit for the chaos in Fallujah, with many commentators placing Sunni Islamist movements on a par with the Roman Empire. One needn’t look beyond even the last few years to realise this is an overstated view within Middle East politics. 
The democratically elected, Sunni Islamist, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt failed following the fall of Mubarak. Much of their time in power, under President Mohamed Morsi, was spent trying to restore order and persuade all sections of the country to accept their (relatively) moderate brand of Islamism. 
Sunni Islamists in Syria, should they defeat Assad, would still need to proffer a strong sense of legitimacy, more so than the Muslim Brotherhood needed in Egypt, due to the extensive suffering the country has faced. 
The motivation to then go and spread Sunni Islamism into Shia-dominated Iraq is exaggerated, because the idea of bringing Syria from the brink of total destruction to becoming a colonising superpower of the Middle East is, quite frankly, ridiculous. 
Lastly, let’s not forget that the armed opposition to Assad are deeply divided between varying levels of Islamists and the secular freedom fighters. 
&nbsp; 
Sectarianism is a lazy label that’s still being used to explain everything 
The narrative that sectarianism is at the heart of violence and chaos in Iraq is a destructive and hyperreal concept. 
With this narrative being constantly driven into the mainstream, and being popularised by the many corners of academia and journalism, sectarian divisions are at risk of becoming a dangerous reality. 
The majority of residents living in the Anbar province, wherein Fallujah is a city, are subscribed to the Sunni interpretation of Islam, but more significantly, sewage facilities and water levels there are some of the poorest in all of Iraq. Anbar has been suffering one of its worst droughts over the past five years, which has harmed agriculture in the area and ruined many people’s livelihoods and main source of income. 
In recent years their protests have been violently suppressed with the government justifying this on the grounds of suspicion against an impending al-Qaeda attack but the lack of transparency has only left the real causes up to interpretation. 
&nbsp; 
Blaming foreign influences means we don’t have to talk about the constitution 
When asked which country has the most influence in Iraq, former interim prime minister of Iraq, Ayad Allawi, believed it to be Iran. Former UK prime minister, Tony Blair, appeared to also share this view, as do many others who paint Iran as the bizarre bogeymen of the Middle East. During the UK’s Iraq Inquiry, Sir Richard Dalton explained that Mr. Blair believed Tehran wanted anarchy in Iraq. 
The extent to which the discussion surrounding Iraq-Iran relations is presented to the public in terms of fear with little logical explanation is dangerously close to abandoning all truth. For instance, Blair believed that Iran was providing support to al-Qaeda in order to resist the occupying forces. 
Despite no evidence of a positive relationship between al-Qaeda – a group, which believes that “Shia blood is halal” – and Iran – a state whose most powerful political authority is a Shia marja’ – there has been a slew of needless discussion debating this link. 
During Iraq’s elections post-2003, political parties received funds from all over the world without having to declare the source, which resulted in accusations of politicians whipping up sectarian support abroad and of nations like Iran and Saudi Arabia having undue influence. Without any declaration of the source of foreign funding, whether it be innocuous or nefarious, the Iraqi electorate had even less reason to trust the parties vying for their votes. 
Human rights have also been stifled because, although the Iraqi constitution considers everyone to be equal, it has an Orwellian passage which elevates Islam and its believers to be more equal than others. 
The homegrown constitution included this confusing passage: “A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established. B. No law that contradicts the principles of democracy may be established.” Some Muslims believe apostasy to be punishable by death, whereas others may believe in the democratic principle of religious freedom. Either way, imprinting a set of laws that can be personalised according to the believer’s wishes is wholly contradictory to the principles of democracy. 
Should someone choose to interpret Islam to be a violent religion and claim that the state needed to be overthrown and replaced by the will of God as opposed to the will of the people, they could theoretically take over a city and claim to have even more legitimacy, according to the constitution, than the democratically elected government. Oh wait&#8230;
<pre>Image from: http://www.concordmonitor.com/csp/mediapool/sites/dt.common.streams.StreamServer.cls?STREAMOID=IkIbJ3d9kntlUgHZtx3VmM$daE2N3K4ZzOUsqbU5sYu20phy6fwyCm7BdT2b0xV_WCsjLu883Ygn4B49Lvm9bPe2QeMKQdVeZmXF$9l$4uCZ8QDXhaHEp3rvzXRJFdy0KqPHLoMevcTLo3h8xh70Y6N_U_CryOsw6FTOdKL_jpQ-&amp;CONTENTTYPE=image/jpeg</pre>

Five Things the Fallujah Stand-Off Reveals About Iraq’s Fragmented Politics

With leaders sworn in and others kicked out, 2013 has certainly been an eventful year in the global political arena
January 2013 
Barack Obama re-elected 
21 January 
<a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/21/inaugural-address-president-barack-obama">Inaugural Address</a> by President Barack Obama, United States. The inauguration coincides with <a href="http://mlkday.gov/">Martin Luther King Day</a> in the United States. Obama’s re-election comes during a difficult period. 
Likud’s victory in Israeli elections 
23 January 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud’s Party wins between<a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/22/world/meast/israel-elections/"> 31 and 33 Knesset seats</a>. This victory raises questions regarding the prospects of a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. 
 February 2013 
Assassination of leftist Tunisian activist Chokri Belaid 
6 February 
The ensuing anger of supporters, friends and relatives from Belaid’s political and ideological family have mounted and escalated into bloody clashes and a political crisis. 
Italian parliamentary elections deadlock 
24-25 February 
The <a href="http://themonkeycage.org/2013/02/28/the-italian-general-election-of-february-2013-deadlock-after-technocracy/">election turnout</a> reaches 75.11 per cent and the votes cast result in a heteroclite outcome: Bersani’s coalition (113 seats), Berlusconi’s 12 party bloc (116 seats), Grillo’s Five Star movement (54 seats) and Monti’s bloc (18 seats). The results of the elections, accompanied with the euro crisis, have made it even more difficult for the Italian political actors to form <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/tag/2013-italian-elections/">coalitions</a>. 
March 2013 
Xi Jinping becomes president of the People’s Republic of China 
14 March 
Presidential elections in Kenya marked by a controversial outcome 
26 March 
Uhuru Kenyatta sworn in as <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kenya2013/">Kenya’s new President</a>. Kenyatta faces several <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/04/201349752557578.html">international charges</a> attended by diplomats, leaders and thousands of Kenyans. 
April 2013 
North Korean crisis 
3 April   
In an <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0403/North-Korea-unexpectedly-closes-entry-to-key-industrial-park-upping-tensions">unexpectedly</a> bold and hostile move, North Korea blocks South Koreans from the joint Kaesong Industrial complex. This was the only remaining <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/03/north-korea-blocks-souths-factory">bilateral initiative</a>. The border town of Kaesong hosted up to 120 South Korean-run factories. The industrial complex <a href="http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/economic-reform/special-administrative-regions/kaesong-industrial-park/">reopened</a> in September. 
Nicolás Maduro elected the new president of Venezuela 
14 April 
Late Hugo Chavez, former president of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela died on 5 March 2013, after a long battle with cancer, and designated Maduro as his successor. 
May 2013 
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif becomes new prime minister of Pakistan 
12 May 
Sharif <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/nawaz-sharif-formally-elected-prime-minister-of-pakistan/2013/06/05/2d1a1fee-cdd0-11e2-8f6b-67f40e176f03_story.htmlhttp:/www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/nawaz-sharif-formally-elected-prime-minister-of-pakistan/2013/06/05/2d1a1fee-cdd0-11e2-8f6b-67f40e176f03_story.html">pledges</a>, “We have no other option expect for democracy”. Many promises are made, particularly regarding the chronic energy shortages in the country. Warnings are addressed to the American administration concerning the drone strikes in Pakistan which are continuing to harm civilians. 
Mass protests erupt in Turkey 
29 May 
The <a href="http://occupygezipics.tumblr.com/">Occupy Gezi</a> Protests contested the urban development plan for Istanbul&#8217;s Taksim Gezi Park. 
June 2013 
The US National Security Agency (NSA) secret surveillance programme unveiled to the public by the Guardian 
6 June 
On 9 June, <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files">Edward Snowden</a> steps out as the major leaks source. Snowden is still being pursued by the United States. He is presently in Russia under asylum. The major leaks have sparked a wide-ranging and controversial debate regarding the right to privacy of common citizens. 
Dr Hassan Rouhani elected as the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
14 June 
Elections in Iran witness the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/iranian-presidential-election-2013">victory</a> of Dr Hassan Rouhani, who <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/17/iran-hassan-rouhani-path-moderation">pledges a path of moderation</a>. Rouhani represents <a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/2013/12/25/the-new-iranian-presence-a-real-transition/">a new hope</a> for change in both domestic and foreign policy affairs. His seemingly proactive and determined posture calling for dialogue and peace are laudable. 
July 2013 
Egypt’s Military Coup 
3 July 
The first democratically-elected Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi, is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23159066">overthrown</a>; mass <a href="http://globalvoicesonline.org/specialcoverage/egyptians-overthrow-morsi/">protests</a> and bloodshed follow. A state of emergency is declared. Supreme Court Chief Justice Adly Mansour is chosen by General Sisi to step in as <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/foreign-affairs-defense/egypt-in-crisis/timeline-whats-happened-since-egypts-revolution/">Egypt’s interim president</a>. Some factions still refuse to call what happened in Egypt a ‘coup’. 
Malala Yousafzai speaks at the United Nations 
12 July 
Malala Yousafzai has become an emblem of resistance across the world. She embodies hope not only for Pakistani girls, but more broadly for girls and women worldwide. 
August 2013 
The Ghouta Chemical Attack, Syria 
21 August 
Chemical weapons are used against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale in the Ghouta area near Damascus. The Syrian regime denies use of such chemicals while <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/meast/syria-civil-war/">an 82-page report</a> by a UN-expert team later in December confirmed the initial September report. 
Robert Mugabe wins presidential elections in Zimbabwe 
3 August 
<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/03/zimbabwe-election-mugabe-wins_n_3700922.html">Eighty-nine-year-old</a> Robert Mugabe is the oldest standing president in Zimbabwe with a 33-year rule. His victory has been contested but the Constitutional Court of Zimbabwe arbitrates by <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/10254858/Zimbabwe-court-rules-Robert-Mugabe-won-free-and-fair-election.html">announcing</a> that “Mugabe won free and fair elections”. 
September 2013 
Landslide victory for Angela Merkel 
22 September 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/22/world/europe/germany-elections/">conservative </a>coalition <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-24197994">wins</a> Germany’s Federal <a href="http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/germany_votes_2013/">election</a>. The Social Democrats (SPD) win 26 per cent of the vote while the liberal Free Democrats (FDP) win only 4.8 per cent, significantly less than the Green Party (8.4 per cent) and the communist Left party (8.6 per cent). Prospects of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/22/us-germany-election-idUSBRE98K06220130922">tough coalition</a> scenarios ensue. 
Binding resolution on Syria adopted 
27 September 
The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopts <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24308763">a binding resolution</a> on Syria’s chemical weapons. US Secretary of State, John Kerry, declares that the UN showed that “diplomacy can be so powerful that it can peacefully defuse the worst weapons of war”. 
October 2013 
United States federal government shutdown 
1-16 October 
<a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-24343698">Deadlock</a> and failure to reach an agreement between the two houses of Congress on a bill lead to significant losses for the economy, and federal employees and agencies. 
US Budget Deal 
17 October 
President Barack Obama <a href="http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/10/16/government-shutdown-debt-limit-congress-deal/2993181/">signed</a> into law a controversial bipartisan deal approved by Congress to reopen the government and <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/10/us-government-partial-shutdown-ends-201310162387774904.html">end</a> the 16-day impasse triggering a government <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-government-shutdown-cost-2-billion-in-lost-productivity-omb-report-says/2013/11/07/e883c3ec-47f2-11e3-bf0c-cebf37c6f484_story.html">shutdown</a>. 
November 2013 
Political Crisis in Ukraine over admission into the EU 
21 November 
Trigger of the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25304797">biggest political crisis</a> since the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. The opposition camps in Kiev’s Independence Square are protesting for greater <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-protests-what-you-need-to-know-2013-12">cooperation</a> with the EU. 
Anti-government rallies in Bangkok with 100,000 protesters 
24 November 
A <a href="http://bigstory.ap.org/article/thailand-political-crisis-timeline">Thai Color War</a> ensues between the <a href="http://links.org.au/node/3604">Yellow Shirts</a> and the Red Shirt Movement. The political crisis has been <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/12/protesting-against-thailand-big-brother-20131227421913272.html">pushed to the streets</a> by the now-stalled amnesty bill that would have allowed Thaksin Shinawatra, Yingluck’s brother, to return to the country from exile. 
December 2013 
A legend departs 
5 December 
Nelson Mandela <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/05/world/africa/nelson-mandela-obit-coverage.html?_r=1&amp;">dies at 95</a>. Three cornerstones of Mandela’s immortal legacy include: an incredible strength; his eternal dedication to learning as a driver of progress both at the individual and societal level; and his ability to move beyond enmity to partnership. 
Execution of Kim Jong Un’s Uncle, Pyongyang, North Korea 
12 December 
Reasons put forward for <a href="http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/12/12/250556545/kim-jong-uns-uncle-formerly-north-koreas-no-2-is-executed">the execution</a> by the official media <a href="http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-kim-appears-20131216,0,3079144.story#ixzz2oqMykM00">include</a>: “anti-state, counterrevolutionary actions, and other crimes including womanising, drug abuse and gambling”. Jang Song Taek was a No. 2 official in North Korea. The leadership of Kim Jong Un in light of this event is found to be increasingly <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/13/execution-kim-jong-un-uncle-instability-north-korea">unstable</a>.
<pre>Image from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/in-pictures-thai-antigovernment-protesters-continue-to-occupy-government-ministries-8969869.html?action=gallery&amp;ino=1</pre>

Global Political Events of 2013

Iran&#8217;s new administration heralds a change; one that has the fragile potential for lasting peace and prosperity 
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The new political leadership in Iran seems determined to demonstrate a real transition from the former regime, or at least it appears to be willing to do so. The hardline aggressive tone of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been replaced by a softer and more pragmatic one, as embodied in Dr Hassan Rouhani’s speech. Rouhani has <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2343255/Irans-moderate-new-leader-Hasan-Rowhani-vows-make-nuclear-process-transparent--says-wont-enrichment.html">stressed</a> that his presidency will pave the way for a new era and that he would follow “the path of moderation and justice, not extremism”. The extent to which electoral and post-electoral promises will be kept remains to be seen, although the first signs are seemingly positive indicators of change. 
Rouhani seems to be <a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec13/iran_08-05.html">trusted</a> by the people of Iran, who place high hopes on his term. The Iranians are certainly tired of the economic sanctions, which have harshly impoverished the population. As Rouhani emphasized during his first UN appearance, unjust sanctions imposed on Iran actually harm the common people who do not have the means to cope with them. By pursuing the sanctions on Iran it is the latter who are targeted and not the political elites and/or the State. 
We must recall that Rouhani has <a href="http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/As-sanctions-bite-Irans-Rouhani-presents-austerity-budget-to-parliament-334311">inherited</a> a complex situation both domestically and internationally. While the priority is to be placed on helping Iranians deal with economic hardships, the domestic challenges cannot be resolved without engaging with the international scene as well. Therefore, the difficulty is twofold for the new leadership. No matter how well-intentioned the Rouhani’s administration might be, in reality, the tasks it faces are huge, from trust building and preserving its legitimacy to triumphing over the economic crisis. The <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25075776">Geneva Deal</a> will be one of the key tests for assessing whether the new Iranian leadership represents a new presence on the international arena and a real transition for the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
The new president, in his first UN appearance, has pointed out two main remarks regarding the nuclear program; first, the imperative that it be used exclusively for peaceful ends, and second, the need to go ahead with uranium enrichment as a necessary condition for achieving the first end. Amid the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-25326782">skepticism</a>  of the American Congress, US Secretary of State John Kerry pushed for the conclusion of a new deal with Iran regarding the development of the nuclear programme. He referred to this period of trust building between the P5+1 group of nations and Iran as a very sensitive diplomatic period, which could turn out to be a <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2013/12/kerry-raises-doubts-over-iran-nuclear-deal-2013121019320922265.html">historic</a> transition point for the Middle East. Indeed, diplomatic skills and trust will be major assets to be showcased. The Geneva Deal might be the most significant brokering deal reached over a decade with Iran.   Its potential for success depends on the sincerity of all the stakeholders. Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammed Javad Zarif has <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/kerry-in-geneva-raising-hopes-for-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran/2013/11/23/53e7bfe6-5430-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html">stated</a> recently that the Geneva Deal is a “process of attempting to restore confidence.&#8221; 
Iran’s new tone is pushing for constructive and substantive <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23591371">negotiation</a>, it does not seem that the ‘new’ Iran is looking for conflict or violence. Rouhani reiterated, on many occasions, the need to shift away for the policy of ultimatums and deterrence towards one of dialogue and bridge-building. It looks as though Iran will be given a <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/25/world/meast/iran-nuclear-deal/">last chance</a> to prove its good intentions. The first consequence to be expected is the <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/10/us-iran-nuclear-talks-idUSBRE9B912020131210">gradual relief</a> from the international sanctions. However, these sanctions are still viewed by Iran as impediments, which could <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/12/13/uk-iran-nuclear-sanctions-idUKBRE9BC0D420131213">terminate the agreement</a>. Thus, Iran is prompted to warranty its good will despite the pressures. Alternatively, if the country loses what is perhaps a very last chance it is being granted, I am afraid it will become increasingly difficult to end the tension or guarantee peace and well-being for its population in the midst of an already unstable region. The Geneva Deal is not just a deal between Iran and the P5+1, it is a deal with a regional outreach. Its consolidation in the coming months offers joyous and peaceful prospects for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as a whole as this interim accord does hold the keys to <a href="http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21590911-not-only-was-deal-iran-best-offer-it-can-transform-worlds-most-troubled">unlock</a> several regional stalemates, including the Syrian crisis and the wars through proxies. 
Finally, it is to be emphasized that the level of trust is already extremely low and that any faulty step may lead to another looping round of sanctions. Iran has everything to gain if it fills its part of the contract and everything to lose if it defaults on any of the clauses of this interim six-month test deal. If Hassan Rouhani and his colleagues decide to make the ‘right’ decisions and place its people at the centre, it must take this historic moment very seriously and prove right the ones who still may want to take its words at face value. If the Geneva deal is just one <a href="http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/11/24/what-critics-are-getting-wrong-about-the-iran-deal/">step</a> and not necessarily a land sliding transition, it remains a beacon of hope, for the peace and prosperity much deserved by the Land of Persia.
<pre>Image from: <a href="http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/07/does-irans-green-movement-need-us-aid/">http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/07/does-irans-green-movement-need-us-aid/</a></pre>

The New Iranian Presence: A Real Transition?

In the complex and sectarian Syrian conflict military enthusiasm must give way to diplomatic muscle 
&nbsp; 
As a Briton who lived in Syria in 2007-8 before the recent crisis, it is primarily my real life experiences and interactions with the people on the ground rather than solely my identity or sectarian affiliation that have shaped my reading and understanding of the current Syrian civil war. 
Conversations, gatherings and chats at little cafes with local people were sufficient to convince me that a significant portion of the Sunni community were not only underrepresented at many of the senior levels of government, but were unfairly treated by the authorities in their daily life. With Assad not being a democrat, and the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alawites">Alawite</a> leadership not a reflection of the majority Sunni demographic, it became clear to me that the Arab Spring had the potential of providing the avenue for the people to channel their repressed anger. 
However, the Syrian elite were not stupid – with the spread and early success of the Arab Spring from Tunisia to Egypt, they understood the dangers and were ready. They realised the dangers of allowing the people to think that these initially small demonstrations would be tolerated. With the palpable fear that any such demonstrations may grow, they <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war">brutally and violently attacked the demonstrators</a>. Without going into the tit-for-tat arguments about the potential excesses of the demonstrators, there is little doubt that the government massively overreacted and killed a significant number of innocent civilians in this early period in what many human rights organisations have called <a href="http://www.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID=11579">war crimes</a>. And it is at this point where we must pause and think: what did the key parties in the conflict do, and what should they have done? 
From a national interest perspective, the Iranian government did not want to lose one of its major Arab allies in what has become a more and more sectarian and intolerant region. Similarly in Lebanon, Hizbullah had a known ally in its resistance movement with Assad. Given a democratic process may lead to a more sectarian anti-Shii majority government, both the short-term interests of Iran and Hizbullah were aligned and thus warranted intervention in favour of the regime. This was bolstered by the <a href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=541_1372880606">petro-dollar funding of the rebels</a>: both those who legitimately wanted a political voice, and those extremist <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Takfiri">takfiris</a> whose main aim was to weaken the Shia-led Iran and Hizbullah. With Syria acting as the geopolitical lightening rod of foreign interests, the legitimate grievances and desires of the Syrian people remained unheeded. 
As a Shia Muslim, I saw the attitude of Iran and Hizbullah in the early days as massively short-sighted. I understood the geopolitical and strategic short-term interests. But (ignoring the immorality of an Islamic nation caring about national interests over human rights), Ahmedinejad and Nasrallah were not too long ago <a href="http://www.islamicinvitationturkey.com/2010/08/08/ahmadinejad-popularity-soars-in-me/">popular in the Arab world</a>. Had they been supportive of a move to a democratic rule (as suggested in my solution below), their respect would have grown. Although there is no clear-cut answer, I would have hoped that together with the moral imperative of loosening ties with dictators when they start killing their own people, this would have been a more straightforward decision. 
Of course there are <a href="http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/05/31/nato-data-assad-winning-the-war-for-syrians-hearts-and-minds/">polls</a> to suggest that perhaps the people may not be as anti-Assad as we might think from the western media, but this should not take away from the fact that there have been no elections, and Iran and Hizbullah are on the side of Assad who is, by definition, a dictator. Therefore, Assad (in the long term) must go – regardless of one’s geopolitical position or strategic objectives, regardless of his religious beliefs or sectarian affiliations, and regardless of whether or not this may lie in the national interests of the bogeymen of Israel and America. 
The problem is that things have changed since the early days. I have now lost faith in the so-called opposition, with atrocities being committed not only by the crazy extremists of <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18048033">Jubhat al-Nusra</a> (with <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22095099">their links to al-Qaeda</a>) and <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant">ISIL</a>, but also more broadly by the <a href="http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2013/07/free_syrian_army_arming_al_qae.php">Free Syrian Army</a>. The opposition have been linked to attacks against <a href="http://www.christianpost.com/news/syrian-christians-attacked-by-al-qaeda-linked-group-churches-shelled-orphans-flee-to-caves-103842/">churches</a> and <a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/sep/10/rand-paul/rand-paul-syrian-rebels-behead-priests-and-eat-hea/">priests</a>, <a href="http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/american-muslim/2013/jul/22/syrian-rebels-attack-shiite-shrines-and-threaten-c/">places of worship</a>, <a href="http://www.aimislam.com/shrine-of-the-great-companion-hijr-ibn-adi-destroyed-and-body-stolen/">the exhumation of bodies</a>, the <a href="http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=20271">targeting of civilians</a> belonging to specific communities, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-23190533">the eating of a heart</a>, <a href="http://rt.com/news/turkey-syria-chemical-weapons-850/?utm_source=browser&amp;utm_medium=aplication_chrome&amp;utm_campaign=chrome">seeking</a> and <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/jabhat-al-nusra-rebels-admit-responsibility-for-chemical-weapons-attack/5347485">potentially using chemical weapons</a>, and acts determined by human rights organisations as <a href="http://www.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID=11579">war crimes</a>– and these are only the atrocities that we know about. Further, being on the side of the neo-conservative war criminals such as Netenyahu, John McCain and Tony Blair as well as the extremist takfiris in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf makes me very nervous. 
Although I am a strong believer in the democratic process, I am now not sure that an immediate transition into democracy could work – the wounds of sectarian hatred are too deep to heal right now. It would take a number of supreme statesmen (unlikely to be women in this region!) for such a thing to even be possible. But just because the USA starting another war is less likely following the <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10309493/America-and-Russia-agree-plan-to-eliminate-Syrias-chemical-weapons.html">Russian proposal</a>, does not mean that we can forget about the Syrian people.<a href="file:///C:/Users/Lubaaba/Downloads/Syria%20Shia%20-%20M%20Versi%20-%20V2%20FK.doc#_msocom_3"> 
</a> 
Our approach must be to flex our diplomatic muscles in the same way we regularly flex our military might to do what is right for the people. We, in the west, have to bite the bullet and engage with Vladimir Putin and Iran’s newly elected President Rouhani. 
It is critical that we offer a route to normalisation of ties with the potential removal of sanctions to persuade a <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/iran-rouhani-syria-ruler_n_3934250.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp00000003http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/iran-rouhani-syria-ruler_n_3934250.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp00000003">willing</a> Iran to work with Assad in finding a solution to the problem. In particular, following a ceasefire, the framework of a compromise should include changes to the constitution to limit the length of a president’s term in power to eight years; to protect freedom of the press and the ability to criticise the president; to enshrine the right of people to form political parties without risk of arrest; to protect the rights of minorities; and to have a clear roadmap to internationally vetted elections within two years. 
At the same time, we need to stop the flow of weapons entering the country and continued funding of extremists from the rebel side not only through explicit condemnation but also through diplomatic pressure on the Gulf countries whose involvement is also detrimental to the well being of the Syrian people. Although not a focus in this piece, the interference of Saudi Arabia and Qatar in this mess is huge, not only in their support of the rebels, but also in their increasingly <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/middle-east-full-blown-religious-war">hostile</a> and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrWhGBMoiWA">sectarian rhetoric</a> that is no doubt instigating the murders of Shias throughout the world. 
With <a href="http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php">millions of refugees</a>, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23455760">over 100,000</a> dead, everyone in Syria either affected directly by the conflict or indirectly by the murder, and the growing hate-filled sectarian rhetoric spreading across the country, we cannot do nothing. 
NOTE: All links to news and media websites should be treated with caution and due scepticism given the clear agenda and interests at play.
<pre>Image from: <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/201211962354550350.html">http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/201211962354550350.html</a></pre>

The Syrian Civil War: Sectarian Violence, Political Agendas and Paths to Peace

In the wake of Benjamin Netanyahu&#8217;s UN speech, activists take to the internet and a meme is born 
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<a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/n/benjamin_netanyahu/index.html?inline=nyt-per">Benjamin Netanyahu</a> and I share three things &#8211; he studied architecture at university, he is interested in Arab-Palestinian political issues (well he is slightly more interested than I am, considering that he is Prime Minister of Israel and all that), and we were both born in October. In light of this I do understand the fervent urge he felt to start sketching again to make a point understood. Like a first year architecture student that furtively uses diagrams (usually cartoonish, since you’re still in first year), Bibi, as he is affectionately known to us, practically conveyed his intention of curtailing Iran&#8217;s nuclear programme by drawing a red line on a poster depicting what he seemed to envision to be a nuclear bomb. No marks for the sketch there. 
Now, <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/israel/index.html?inline=nyt-geo">Israeli</a> intelligence is usually aware of whatever threats come their way or in the way of any of their interests. The Zionist propaganda machinery is quite arguably the finest in the world and has been that way for centuries; it may perhaps be safely assumed that its power will not diminish for some time to come. But little did all Bibi’s horses and all Bibi’s men realise that, with the great advances in technology, one does not necessarily need to use a pen anymore to make a point with a diagram. 
Immediately after <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/world/middleeast/netanyahu-warns-that-iran-bombmaking-ability-is-nearer.html?hp&amp;_r=0">Bibi spoke</a> with that pseudo-American accent at the <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/u/united_nations/index.html?inline=nyt-org">UN</a> <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/g/general_assembly/index.html?inline=nyt-org">General Assembly</a>, oozing with confidence that expected him to be showered with blandishments and glutinous praise to follow his artistic skills reminiscent of <a href="http://www.vangoghgallery.com/">Vincent Van Gogh</a>, the online activists took to the virtual streets and a meme was born. 
I present below some of the best meme’s I found and do hope Bibi’s insight, and that masterstroke that his speech writers felt when they inserted this piece of theatre, has served you well. 
&nbsp; 
This here is the original image of Bibi sketching during his speech. Yes, this is indeed the original. 
<a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/NATIONS-popup.jpg"><img loading="lazy" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-6964" title="NATIONS-popup" src="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/NATIONS-popup.jpg" alt="" width="445" height="500" /></a> 
&nbsp; 
The following are some of the best memes I&#8217;ve come across. 
<a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1.jpg"><img loading="lazy" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-6965" title="1" src="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/1.jpg" alt="" width="580" height="319" /></a> 
<a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2.jpg"><img loading="lazy" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-6966" title="2" src="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/2.jpg" alt="" width="580" height="384" /></a> 
<a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/4.jpg"><img loading="lazy" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-6967" title="4" src="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/4.jpg" alt="" width="580" height="401" /></a> 
<a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/61.jpg"><img loading="lazy" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-6976" title="6" src="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/61.jpg" alt="" width="580" height="430" /></a> 
<a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/8.jpg"><img loading="lazy" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-6969" title="8" src="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/8.jpg" alt="" width="578" height="435" /></a> 
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The following meme conveys an image of Israel&#8217;s ambition of expanding its landmass to areas several times the size of its current borders (even with the illegal settlements). Of course this is a satirical expression by the creator of the meme, but the thought of it is nonetheless disturbing. 
<a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/7.jpg"><img loading="lazy" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-6970" title="7" src="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/7.jpg" alt="" width="580" height="401" /></a> 
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Easily the most historically and ideologically accurate meme, this one below shows Bibi seemingly pointing to the loss of Palestinian land usurped by Israel against international law from 1946 to the present day. 
<a href="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/3.jpg"><img loading="lazy" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-6971" title="3" src="http://www.the-platform.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/3.jpg" alt="" width="580" height="362" /></a>

The Curious Sketch of Benjamin Netanyahu

Tensions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the international community have reached new heights.  While the United States and the European Union have imposed drastic new <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/02/05/uk-iran-mood-idUKTRE8140AH20120205">sanctions</a> against Iran to compel it to change or be more transparent about its nuclear development program, discussions in Washington and in Israel about a <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/05/iran-warns-attacks-nuclear-bases">military strike</a> have intensified.  Iran has threatened to block the Straight of Hormuz, which would potentially <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/05/us-iran-israel-strike-idUSTRE81406320120205">harm the world economy</a>, and to unleash a conflagration, if attacked, that would reach beyond the Middle East. 
As is often the case, the governments involved in this dangerous escalation of tensions are ignoring the interests of those who have the most at stake, namely, <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/jan/24/iran-sanctions-nuclear">citizens</a> hoping for peace, democracy and human rights, and whose very lives would be devastated by a war. 
More important than focusing on Iran’s putative nuclear threat is the <a href="http://www.iranhumanrights.org/">grave human rights situation</a> in the country. If human rights in the country could be brought up to higher standards, there can be no doubt that the international community would have a reliable partner regarding compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Violations of human rights and Iran’s international conflicts are part of the same syndrome.  Iran’s rulers need conflict with Israel and the West to divert attention from their <a href="http://www.freemedia.at/index.php?id=288&amp;tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5996&amp;cHash=23c105f7d5">repression of civil liberties</a>, to demonise their internal critics as unpatriotic and <a href="http://www.insideofiran.com/en/archive/42-important-news/7952-iranian-parliament-accuses-opposition-leaders-of-treason.html">treasonous</a>, and to justify their bloody security lockdown on dissent. Israel, the US, and the EU have not disappointed them. In fact, tensions with Iran also serve the political interests of both governing and insurgent parties abroad &#8211; demonstrated most strikingly through <a href="http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2060875/Republican-debate-Mitt-Romney-Newt-Gingrich-Iran-war.html">statements</a> made by American presidential hopefuls. 
What is happening in Iran regarding human rights shocks even long-time human rights advocates who have seen harsh crackdowns by totalitarian governments. Since Iran’s tainted 2009 presidential elections, security and intelligence agencies have <a href="http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html">assumed control</a> over most governmental structures, most notably the Judiciary, and have taken violent steps to <a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/freedom-house-commends-positive-action-un-human-rights-council">stifle dissent</a>. <a href="http://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/iran">Executions</a> have skyrocketed with over 600 in 2011, most for drug-related crimes that do not warrant capital punishment according to the United Nations.  <a href="http://iranhr.net/spip.php?article1984">Mass, secret executions</a> are taking place following unfair or non-existent trials, with the apparent goal of intimidating the population. 
Members of <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/religious-death-squads-targeting-iranian-intellectuals-1191390.html">Iran’s intellectually</a> rich and diverse civil society have been arbitrarily detained, <a href="http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&amp;address=102x608708">tortured</a> and ill-treated, subjected to show-trials and harsh jail terms, or driven into silence or exile.  Those hardest hit have been the human rights and <a href="http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/reports/3007-silencing-the-women-s-rights-movement-in-iran.html">women’s rights</a> organisations, alongside students, <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10554&amp;LangID=E">independent lawyers</a> and independent <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/18/three-iranian-journalists-arrested">journalists</a>.  The country’s leading opposition figures have been under an illegal <a href="http://www.iranhumanrights.org/2011/08/karroubi-in-danger/">“house arrest”</a> for nearly a year.  University students have been <a href="http://www.bahai.us/category/iran/denial-of-education/">denied education</a> for having participated in demonstrations or otherwise expressed their views, and for their religious beliefs.  The universities themselves have been purged of many leading scholars. 
The Iranian government is trying to <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jun/15/iran-jamming-technology-tv-radio-internet">choke off</a> the flow of information from the outside world by jamming satellite TV broadcasts and restricting internet access, and continues to violate privacy and communications using technology imported from Europe and China.  Meanwhile the state television cooperates in demonising and convicting dissidents, and the government is planning its own <a href="http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/halal-internet">“halal” internet</a>. 
Prior to the present political crisis, the US and EU had, albeit slowly, come to the realisation that they should focus on human rights, a policy that would demonstrate Iran’s increasing rejection of its international legal obligations and express solidarity with the Iranian people.  Robust UN resolutions were passed, including a Human Rights Council resolution establishing a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/24/us-iran-rights-idUSTRE72N58Y20110324">Special Rapporteur</a> on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran.  A number of Iran’s former friends in the international community, as well as people from across the world, joined calls to stop human rights abuses in the country. 
Regrettably, Western governments have allowed the Islamic Republic to sidestep these pressures and to cast itself as protecting its sovereignty and culture, and as the potential victim of an unprovoked military strike &#8211; a posture that tightens its own grip on power.  Human rights violations in Iran are generally off the front pages, supplanted by bellicose and self-serving exchanges that mask the <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/09/29/Gallup-Suffering-in-Iran-rises-sharply/UPI-80951317311746/">suffering</a> of the Iranian people.  But ultimately, the international community needs to understand that a long-term strategy aimed at peace and cooperation with Iran will only succeed if human rights form its central demand.
<pre>Image from: http://missionfreeiran.org/2010/11/18/dec11-pr/</pre>

Escalating Tensions Serve Iranian Government’s Policy of Repression

Why is a war with Iran beginning to feel like a foregone conclusion? 
It has been a mere matter of weeks since America’s ostensible military “withdrawal” from Iraq, and yet talk of a new middle-eastern war seems to be growing in intensity. The ominous spectre of 2003 lingers, and the benefit of hindsight is overlooked. 
The latest event of note involves the EU’s decision to adopt sanctions against Iran’s oil industry &#8211; a move that,<a href="http://rt.com/news/iran-close-strait-hormuz-embargo-455/"> according </a>to an Iranian government spokesperson, will “definitely” result in the closure of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, through which an estimated one-fifth of the world’s oil flows. 
The trouble with this scenario is that if Iran does carry out its response (and you can never be quite sure), it crosses a “red line” publicly <a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57354645/panetta-iran-cannot-develop-nukes-block-strait/">demarcated by US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta</a>. This dramatically increases the prospect of military action by the US &#8211; with subsequent Iranian retaliation &#8211; and open warfare. 
While the threat of Iran’s nuclear capacity is being talked up, the possibility, or even legality, of constructive diplomatic American discourse may be strangled by an unhelpful proposed legislation that has already been passed by the House of Representatives. The “Iran <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/110516_HR%201905%20-%20Iran%20Threat%20Reduction%20Act.pdf">Threat</a> Reduction Act” would effectively criminalise negotiations with Iran by any member of the American government, except in highly restricted circumstances. <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mj-rosenberg/us-iran-israel_b_1074058.html">Many commentators</a> see this as an alarming move of intent, despite it <a href="http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.1905:">not yet having passed the senate</a>. 
Elsewhere, establishment journals feature articles <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137038/jamie-m-fly-and-gary-schmitt/the-case-for-regime-change-in-iran">extolling the virtues of regime change</a>, whilst the<a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0120/Regime-change-How-fear-of-Iran-nukes-and-campaign-politics-revived-the-call"> Republican party Presidential frontrunners</a>, influential<a href="http://mondoweiss.net/2012/01/winep-official-says-u-s-strategy-is-aimed-at-provoking-pearl-harbor-that-justifies-war-with-iran.html"> Washington think tank figures</a>, and the conservative press evince a keen appetite for war. 
With such a severe stance issuing from familiar quarters, it may be salutary to review the nature of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program. The centrepiece of the emerging casus belli is the mentioned International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] report, released in November last year; it <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/nov/09/iran-nuclear-programme-iaea-report">concluded</a> that Iran is moving toward nuclear weapons capability &#8211; but stopped short of stating that this is Tehran’s goal. 
That may sound concerning, but even the IAEA report itself is suspect according to Robert Kelley, former Director of the agency. Quoted in <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2012/jan/13/iran-nuclear-weapons">The Guardian</a> this week, and by<a href="http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2011/11/iran-and-the-iaea.html"> Seymour Hersh in the New Yorker</a> last year, Kelley described the report’s findings as “old news,” which led him to speculate, “why [is] this same stuff now considered ‘new information’ by the same reporters” who covered such conclusions during his tenure? 
Kelley added that a very significant amount of the material referenced in the IAEA paper was drawn from “a single source: a laptop… allegedly supplied to the IAEA by a Western intelligence agency, whose provenance could not be established.” 
As Hersh also reported, a change in tone from the IAEA over Iran&#8217;s nuclear program appears to have coincided with a change at the top of the organisation. The new head, Yukiya Amano, who replaced the cautious Muhammad ElBaradei, was described in a <a href="http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/230076">Wikileaks released US diplomatic memo</a> as being “solidly in the U.S. court on every strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.” With this in mind, Hersh’s <a href="http://www.democracynow.org/2011/11/21/seymour_hersh_propaganda_used_ahead_of">public conclusion</a> that the IAEA report was a “political document” is hardly a radical conclusion. 
With military action, the benefits of even the most clinical strikes on Iran are not convincing. Assuming it were a given that Iran was intent on acquiring a nuclear device, an attack would probably only delay its development and dramatically increase hostility, as Defence Secretary Panetta himself <a href="http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/u-s-strike-of-iran-s-nuclear-facilities-may-have-unintended-consequences-1.394875">conceded</a> last year. 
With the stakes being so high and so much doubt in so many key areas – as well as eight terrible years of Iraq as testament to the folly of unnecessary recourse to preventative war &#8211; why does a conflict with Tehran still appear so inevitable? 
Image from: <a href="http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/nuclearprogram.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iran/nuclearprogram.html</a>